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The Ambiguous Legacy of Ngô Đình Diệm in
South Vietnam’s Second Republic (–)
On November , , Sài Gòn’s Notre Dame Basilica is packed withspectators, and the streets outside teem with throngs of onlookers.
Vietnam Press, the Republic of Vietnam’s official news service, reports that
over five thousand people turn out for the commemorations, which continue
later that afternoon at the Mạc Đĩnh Chi Cemetery. In attendance are
a number of political notables, including the president’s wife, Vice President
Trần Văn Hương, several cabinet ministers, and even former Generals Đỗ
Mậu and Lê Văn Nghiêm, both noted enemies of the man being honoured.
At the cemetery, standing next to the fallen man’s grave, is Trương Công
Cừu, Chairman of the Revolutionary Social Humanist Party [Việt Nam
Nhân Xã Cách Mạng Đảng], or Nhân Xã, widely known in political circles
as a thinly veiled attempt to revive the former governing Cần Lao Party.
Trương Công Cừu eulogizes the man they have all gathered to remember:
“He was the incarnation of the noblest ideals of our race and mankind.
Animated by a glorious ideal from childhood, he consecrated his whole
existence to the righteous cause . . . he brought South Vietnam from a depen-
dent, exhausted, disordered and disorganized position into the ranks of
a sovereign, prosperous and well-disciplined nation, respected by the whole
world, friends and foes alike.” But the death of the man to whom Trương
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Công Cừu referred was not, however, a recent passing—in , he had been
dead for eight years—and his demise in  had brought far more sub-
stantial crowds into the streets of Sài Gòn, who cheered and danced for joy
rather than mourn the news of his downfall. As these very different
responses to his death suggest, Ngô Đình Diệm, the Republic of Vietnam’s
first president, left an ambivalent but intriguingly fluid legacy, his star rising
and falling in response to evolving trends and perceptions that emerged long
after his death.
Ngô Đình Diệm has long been caricatured in English-language studies of
the Vietnam War as little more than an American puppet, or a hopelessly
out-of-touch traditional “mandarin” unable to comprehend, much less
respond to, the rapidly changing world around him. But in recent years,
he has been the subject of considerable attention by a new generation of
Vietnamese-language proficient historians who have revealed him to be an
idealistic albeit conservative nation-builder who resisted domestic and
American pressure to compromise his vision. Nonetheless, although Ngô
Đình Diệm was a more complex and sophisticated leader than most
accounts have traditionally acknowledged, the divergent attitudes toward
his death portrayed above are indicative of his controversial status, both
among scholars and in South Vietnam following the  coup that deposed
him. Consistently misrepresented as an ephemeral figure in subsequent
South Vietnamese politics, Ngô Đình Diệm is mistakenly assumed to have
been all but forgotten following the celebrations greeting news of his death.
One particularly influential example, Frances FitzGerald’s Fire in the Lake—
which won the National Book Award, Pulitzer Prize, and Bancroft Prize—
asserts that “the people of Saigon rarely spoke of the Diem regime” after his
death, a passage still cited without scrutiny in recent scholarship.
In fact, as we shall see, Ngô Đình Diệm’s memory loomed large over
South Vietnam’s Second Republic, which faced many of the same lingering
challenges that he had confronted and in some cases created. Heated dis-
cussions of his legacy featured prominently in Sài Gòn’s raucous but at times
relatively free press, especially after revelations from the Pentagon Papers in
 appeared to many commentators to cast him in a more sympathetic
light. Ngô Đình Diệm’s image and governing style also proved remarkably
persistent, with the Nhân Xã Party striving to revitalize the Diệmist Cần Lao
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brand, and with President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu—who had led the final attack
on Ngô Đình Diệm’s palace—courting former Cần Lao Party architects and
emulating key political structures of his predecessor’s regime. Additionally,
impressions of Ngô Đình Diệm’s personality and policies informed popular
responses to the governments that succeeded him, whose leaders were
measured—if not defined—by past relations with the former president or
the junta that ousted and murdered him. Mounting public criticism of
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was conditioned by bitter experiences of similar political
models forged under Ngô Đình Diệm, whose name, along with the Cần Lao
moniker, became something of a pejorative levied within South Vietnam’s
political class to express despair over Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s perceived author-
itarianism. Likewise, figures such as Dương Văn Minh, the public face of the
 coup, would both enjoy considerable esteem and suffer vicious but
localized resentment for their role in toppling Ngô Đình Diệm. During the
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu era, Dương Văn Minh in particular emerged as the
emblematic leader of a diverse coalition of anti-military civilians who coa-
lesced against Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and the Nhân Xã Party much as they had
in opposition to Ngô Đình Diệm and the Cần Lao.
Throughout the Second Republic then, Ngô Đình Diệm remained an
evocative symbol with strong emotional connotations—both positive and,
more often, negative—according to the outlook of the beholder. Long after
his passing, he served as a symbolic wedge, reinforcing South Vietnam’s all
but intractable social fragmentation. This article challenges the prevailing
notion that Ngô Đình Diệm was a fleeting presence in South Vietnamese
politics after his death by examining his contested legacy during the Second
Republic. It analyzes the political impact of the regional and religious polar-
ization that he posthumously aggravated and prolonged, the instructive
limitations of the neo-Cần Lao Nhân Xã Party, the intense but fleeting
Diệmist revival in , and the ways in which Ngô Đình Diệm’s memory
informed criticism of his successor Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, which reached
a crescendo after the latter’s widely reviled unopposed re-election in .
Although recent scholarship has devoted significant effort to reconsidering
the Ngô Đình Diệm era, contemporaneous South Vietnamese interpreta-
tions of his reign have received much less attention. In fact, Ngô Đình
Diệm’s ambivalent status within South Vietnam had a considerable impact
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on later political developments, providing a basic vocabulary and compar-
ative framework for assessing subsequent state affairs, shaping perceptions
of and reactions to his successors, and exacerbating the underlying social
tensions that his contested memory came to symbolize. As this article hopes
to demonstrate, Ngô Đình Diệm’s lasting posthumous impact on South
Vietnam’s Second Republic is a critical dimension to consider in evaluating
his legacy.
Political Dynamics of the Late Ngô Đình Diệm Era
In hindsight, many South Vietnamese observers would come to date the
turning point for the NgôĐình Diệm regime to the abortive effort by a group
of dissident paratroopers to depose him on November , . His palace
surrounded, the President appeared to defer to the rebels’ demands, all
the while summoning loyal reinforcements who arrived the following
morning to crush the insurgents along with a crowd of several hundred
anti-government civilian sympathizers. But though the coup attempt failed
to dislodge the increasingly beleaguered regime, it came to represent the
moment when both the army and civilian political groups began losing faith
in the government, and when regional and religious equilibrium deterio-
rated. In the years that followed, the government found itself beset with
a litany of crises, including a burgeoning rural communist insurrection,
religious violence, discontent in the military, growing popular unrest, and
a widening schism with its ever more intrusive American ally. As we shall
see, these familiar recurring developments would once again emerge after
lingering grievances from the Ngô Đình Diệm era intensified during the
Second Republic, under Nguyễn Văn Thiệu.
Of particular concern for many government critics was the encroachment
into public affairs by the Cần Lao Party, the clandestine political network
inspired by Ngô Đình Diệm’s guiding philosophy of Personalism [Nhân vị],
but increasingly perceived as an instrument for advancing the Ngô family’s
private interests. “By ,” future ambassador to the United States Bùi
Diễm recalled, “the government had become, in essence, a family-run
oligarchy. Hanging over everything like a pall were the police-state measures
that kept the jails filled and silenced dissident voices,” he added, “and all this
was complemented by an expanding guerrilla war, organized by the
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remnants of the Vietminh infrastructure but drawing on the support of
badly disaffected people at every level of society.” In the civil service, the
promotion of unqualified Cần Lao Party members was especially resented,
resulting in a wave of resignations. “Professionalism was disappearing,”
lamented Nguyễn Hữu Hanh, who stepped down as Director of the Central
and Commercial Credit Banks in  to protest their use as “a financial and
political support for Nhu’s Can Lao Party and Diem’s family members’
business undertakings.” The Cần Lao Party had an equally demoralizing
effect on the military, where, at least according to Army of the Republic of
Vietnam [Quân lực Việt Nam Cộng hòa] (ARVN) Ninth Division com-
mander Lâm Quang Thi, “it was a well-known fact that to advance under
Diem’s regime, one had to be a member of the Can Lao Party, a Catholic, and
a resident of Central Vietnam.” Like Bùi Diệm, Lâm Quang Thi also saw
 as the year when “it was apparent to everyone that President Diem’s
one-man rule, the excess and corruption of his entourage, and the growing
power of a centralized oligarchy had caused dissatisfaction and resentment
in the population and in the army.”
In January , communist guerillas overran a regiment of the ARVN
Twenty First Division in Tây Ninh Province, the first in a series of assaults
sweeping the countryside that year. Cited in the Caravelle Manifesto [Tuyên
ngôn Caravelle], an open letter signed in April by eighteen prominent civil-
ian leaders urging administrative reforms, the episode in Tây Ninh also
touched a nerve within ARVN. The defeat was attributed by many officers
to the hasty promotion of inexperienced commander Trần Thanh Chiêu,
dismissed as nothing more than “a trusty Cần Lao Catholic subordinate” by
ARVN Military Security Service Director Đỗ Mậu. Himself a Cần Lao
member, albeit an ever more disillusioned one, Đỗ Mậu would regard the
paratroopers’ subsequent November “mutiny” as “the final link in a long
chain of political and military crises which the Diệm regime faced due to its
widespread clumsiness and lack of preparation.” And though he had
abstained from the  rebellion, by , ĐỗMậu was working with Trần
Kim Tuyến, yet another disgruntled former loyalist, and later, with Generals
Dương Văn Minh, Trần Văn Đôn and Lê Văn Kim, to eliminate Ngô Đình
Diệm. Crucially,  also saw the Dương Văn Minh, Trần Văn Đôn and Lê
Văn Kim trio holding their first clandestine meetings to discuss a mutual
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“sense of discontent” over the Ngô family’s “exclusive exploitation of the
nation’s resources.” Three years later, citing alarm over the government
crackdown against Buddhist and student demonstrators, the generals had
determined that NgôĐình Diệm and his brother NgôĐình Nhu had to go.
Arguably the Ngô Đình Diệm regime’s defining crisis, the  Buddhist
uprising has come to be regarded as almost preordained—the inevitable
result of what Western observers saw as the inherent unsuitability of a Cath-
olic leader in majority Buddhist Vietnam. For David Halberstam, it was
a truism that “by Vietnamese standards, there was little legitimacy;
Diem . . . an American creation . . .was a Catholic in a Buddhist country,
a Central Vietnamese in the South, . . . [and] a mandarin, a member of the
feudal aristocracy in a country swept by revolution.” But before the Vesak
Day shootings on May , —when, in an act one eyewitness described as
“inhuman repression,” nine Buddhist demonstrators were killed by govern-
ment security forces in Huế—relations between Catholics, the state, and
South Vietnam’s Buddhist population were more stable than subsequent
events would suggest, if still somewhat less than cordial. Although Catho-
lics were historically subject to state persecution, during the reign of
Emperor Minh Mạng (–) for instance, there had also been periods
of official tolerance following the ascension of Gia Long (Nguyễn Phúc Ánh)
in . And despite their portrayal in post-war national histories as some-
thing of a colonialist fifth column, Catholic communities in Vietnam had
a far more complex relationship with radical politics than stereotypical
depictions of Ngô Đình Diệm partisans suggest. Catholicism in South
Vietnam was also characterized by considerable diversity. While northern-
dominated political groups like the Cần Lao and later, Nhân Xã, the Greater
Solidarity Force [Lực lượng Đại Đoàn kết] (GSF), or the Catholic Citizens’
Bloc [Khối Công dân Công giáo] (CCB) had a reputation for uncompro-
mising anti-communism and staunch support for the war, southern Catholic
intellectuals, in publications such as Hy Vọng [Hope], Đối Diện [Face-to-
Face] or Sống Đạo [Faithful Living], led calls to negotiate with the National
Liberation Front [Mặt trận Dân tộc Giải phóng Miền Nam] (NLF), and were
among the government’s most prominent and persistent critics. Indeed,
during the  presidential election, many Catholics rebuffed Nguyễn Văn
Thiệu, a Catholic convert, opting instead to support Trần Văn Hương, the
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southern Buddhist still reviled by many Buddhists for suppressing their
protests during his brief  stint as prime minister.
South Vietnamese Buddhists were likewise divided over the question of
relations with the state, with Thích Trí Quang advocating forceful resistance
against Ngô Đình Diệm even as Thích Tâm Châu pursued a settlement with
the embattled president, at least until the regime’s resort to violence ulti-
mately forced his hand. This rift crystallized during the Second Republic
after Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s sponsorship of Thích Tâm Châu’s small,
northern-dominated Quốc Tự faction alienated the much larger Central
Vietnamese Ấn Quang bloc, an act Dương Văn Minh compared to French
“divide and rule” tactics and to Ngô Đình Diệm’s “unacceptable” interven-
tion in Buddhist affairs. Both emerging factions, however, were motivated
by a collective sense of anxiety that Buddhism was fading from Vietnamese
life. Indeed, the Buddhist Struggle Movement [Phong trào Phật giáo Tranh
đấu] that confronted Ngô Đình Diệm in the early s drew on a long-
standing Buddhist Revival [Chấn hưng Phật giáo] tradition from the s,
which called for a return to Buddhist principles and insisted that Buddhism
belonged at the core of Vietnamese national identity.
This drew the Struggle Movement into conflict with local Catholics led by
Ngô Đình Thục, the Archbishop of Huế and Ngô Đình Diệm’s older
brother, a confrontation with lasting consequences that would linger
throughout the Second Republic. Hoping to turn Central Vietnam into
a Catholic heartland, Ngô Đình Thục strove to assert Catholic power in the
region, and his extravagant efforts to this end and heavy-handed dealings
with local Buddhists contributed greatly to the May  tragedy. Following the
massacre, the crisis that would precipitate the president’s downfall escalated
rapidly after Ngô Đình Diệm lost patience with younger brother Ngô Đình
Cẩn’s conciliatory approach, instead coming to favor Ngô Đình Nhu and
NgôĐình Thục’s repressive tactics. The ensuing crackdown resulted in the
iconic, globally resonant self-immolation of Thích Quảng Đức on June ,
the much-condemned August  police pagoda raids, and the rapid deteri-
oration of relations between Buddhists, Catholics, and the state. Thus, in
spurning the efforts of Ngô Đình Cẩn and Thích Tâm Châu to contain these
simmering religious hostilities, Ngô Đình Diệm elevated latent but previ-
ously manageable Catholic-Buddhist tensions to a new level of intensity,
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provoking an outburst of violence and resentment that was by no means
preordained even in the immediate aftermath of Vesak Day. Perhaps the
most enduring legacy of his tenure, this eruption of mostly dormant reli-
gious animosities created immense long-term political damage that subse-
quent governments struggled to repair.
In Washington, State Department officials were alarmed by the govern-
ment’s inability to dampen the protests, and embarrassed by the growing
public relations nightmare caused by the prolonged standoff. A turning
point came on August , when a State Department cable to the Sài Gòn
Embassy, issued while senior officials were away for the weekend, instructed
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. to demand Ngô Đình Nhu’s removal,
and further cautioned that if “Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we
must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.” But while
President John F. Kennedy later clarified to Ambassador Lodge that he
“reserve[d] a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instruc-
tions,” and in spite of his grave doubts about what a coup might bring, he
would never waver from the policy of deposing Ngô Đình Diệm should he
continue to resist American-backed reforms. On November , having
secured both American blessing and the loyalty of General Tôn Thất Đính,
whose troops were strategically positioned surrounding Sài Gòn, the gen-
erals—Dương Văn Minh, Trần Văn Đôn and Lê Văn Kim—made their
move, their forces capturing Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother Ngô Đình
Nhu the following morning and executing them in the back of an armored
personnel carrier. South Vietnam’s First Republic had come to an abrupt
and unseemly end.
Putting the Pieces Back Together
Although the generals and their American collaborators were convinced that
eliminating Ngô Đình Diệm was necessary to stem the state’s spiralling
disintegration, ousting the president only accelerated the crisis it was in-
tended to resolve, ushering in a period of utter political chaos. From the
outset, the generals’ self-proclaimed Revolution [Cuộc Cách mạng] lacked
a legal basis, and was characterized by what one account describes as the
“narrow minds and visions and the boundless ambitions” of its leaders.
Worse still for the White House was Dương Văn Minh’s apparent willingness
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to negotiate a settlement with the communists, who wasted little time exploit-
ing the tumult in Sài Gòn to expand and consolidate their control in the
countryside, building on the wave of momentum they had enjoyed from the
start of the  campaign. When resolutely anti-communist officer Nguyễn
Khánh launched the Readjustment [Cuộc Chỉnh lý], a second coup sweeping
aside the initial triumvirate of generals some three months later, he enjoyed
immediate American support. “Perhaps,” reflected former Foreign Minister
Vũ Văn Mẫu on the Dương Văn Minh trio, “intoxication with victory and
fame had lulled these generals toward defeat.”
Enjoying none of the initial prestige associated with those who had over-
thrown Ngô Đình Diệm, and with an even more limited popular support
base, the aloof and uncharismatic Nguyễn Khánh likewise struggled to
restore political order. Initially, he sought to partner with the Đại Việt Party
[Đại Việt Quốc dân Đảng], a regionally fragmented clandestine political
network which eschewed grassroots organization for efforts to command
power by infiltrating top bureaucratic positions. Hoping that association
with Đại Việt politicians—known for their hostility to Ngô Đình Diệm—
would defuse allegations that he intended to restore Catholic Ngô family
partisans to power, Nguyễn Khánh soon fell out with the party after un-
covering a February Đại Việt plot to seize control of his government from
within. Instead, he turned for support to a loose coalition of Buddhists and
students, whose demands included the May ,  execution of staunch
Catholic Ngô Đình Cẩn as proof of Nguyễn Khánh’s anti-Ngô family cre-
dentials, an event which further aggravated South Vietnam’s chronic
Catholic-Buddhist rupture. Within the military, Nguyễn Khánh also came
to rely on the Young Turks [Nhóm các tướng trẻ], a group of junior officers
including Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Nguyễn Chánh Thi, and Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, who
rose to prominence by suppressing a failed anti-Nguyễn Khánh military
coup led by Catholic generals in September . Their influence further
enhanced after putting down a second abortive Catholic officers’ coup in
February , the Young Turks capitalized on the chaos by removing
Nguyễn Khánh from power altogether, replacing him with the gregarious
but impulsive Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. All the while, the prolonged Catholic-
Buddhist rivalry saw successive politicians dismissed from the increasingly
titular position of prime minister. In February , Trần Văn Hương was
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replaced by Phan Huy Quát after a wave of Buddhist protests, only for Phan
Huy Quát, a northern Buddhist Đại Việt, to be pressured into resignation by
hostile Catholic groups, prompting Nguyễn Cao Kỳ to declare an end to the
shaky façade of civilian rule altogether in June .
Meanwhile, in Vietnam’s Central Highlands, yet another toxic legacy of
the Ngô Đình Diệm era became apparent with the sudden emergence of
the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races [Front de Lutte
des Races Opprimés] (FULRO), an alliance of ethnic minorities opposed
to Ngô Đình Diệm’s longstanding policy of flooding the once-autonomous
highlands with ethnic Vietnamese settlers. In September , US-trained
FULRO special forces swept across Buôn Mê Thuột Province denouncing
the government’s “systematic genocidal policy” and demanding the with-
drawal of “Vietnamese imperialists” from the region. A second December
 uprising, after talks with the government broke down, was forcibly
suppressed, resulting in the execution of four FULRO rebels and the exile
of its more militant leaders to Cambodia. Nonetheless, tensions between
Sài Gòn and the highlands minorities represented yet another lingering
fissure from the Ngô Đình Diệm era that plagued the Second Republic,
not least in the form of decisive pockets of ethnic minority support
for communist forces in the highlands as they prepared their final 
offensive.
The FULRO uprising came as White House officials, alarmed by com-
munist progress in the countryside, prepared a vast expansion of US involve-
ment in the war to follow the  presidential election, in spite of grave if
private doubts that escalation could succeed in bringing Hà Nội to heel.
Beginning in the spring of , American troop deployments combined
with massive economic investment fundamentally transformed South Viet-
namese society, a process which, as we shall see, had the effect of recasting
the First Republic from a time of political turmoil to one of relative tran-
quility in the memories of many South Vietnamese. But while the introduc-
tion of American ground troops managed to check communist military
advances, it did little to stabilize South Vietnam’s protracted political chaos.
In March , a second far more substantial Buddhist uprising in
Central Vietnam attracted the sympathy of thousands of students, teachers,
civil servants, and even the mayor of Đà Nẵng, resulting in the effective loss
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of Huế and Đà Nẵng from central government control. What began as
a power struggle between Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and Nguyễn Chánh Thi, the
popular Buddhist commander of I Corps in Central Vietnam, soon acquired
familiar political, regional and religious implications after Buddhist protes-
ters led by Thích Trí Quang seized on local resentment over Nguyễn Chánh
Thi’s March  dismissal to demand an end to military rule, perceived
Buddhist alienation, and the rapidly intensifying American-backed war.
Particularly effective in motivating the crowd was a series of Huế radio
broadcasts in which Thích Trí Quang warned that Nguyễn Chánh Thi’s
removal was intended to clear the way for the return to power of Ngô Đình
Diệm loyalists. Local ARVN discipline began to break down as a growing
number of Buddhist soldiers disobeyed orders and joined the insurrection.
And in Huế, angry crowds burned the American Consulate and United
States Information Service (USIS) library to the ground, defying even Thích
Trí Quang’s efforts to rein in the violence. Meanwhile, back in Sài Gòn,
counter-demonstrations by Catholic groups, alarmed at their prospects
under a Buddhist-dominated state and concerned that the disorder would
embolden the communists, raised the pressure on Nguyễn Cao Kỳ to
respond. As it had with FULRO, the military opted for a show of force,
with Nguyễn Cao Kỳ ordering a May  assault on Đà Nẵng that ultimately
won back control of the central coast after weeks of bitter street-to-street
guerrilla combat, resulting in the deaths of an estimated one hundred pro-
testers and the arrest of Thích Trí Quang and thousands of supporters.
With the protesters suppressed but far from placated, the  demon-
strations represented yet another manifestation of South Vietnam’s by now
virtually intractable polarization, accompanied by a prevailing sense of cyn-
icism and widespread suspicion of the state. Though clearly exacerbated by
the anarchy that followed the  coup, the ensuing explosion of street
violence had been ultimately set in motion by the Ngô family, whose nep-
otism and authoritarianism had activated South Vietnam’s underlying social
fault-lines, resulting in rapid political deterioration already well underway
before the ineffectual coup that deposed them. And while the protesters in
Central Vietnam had proved no match for American-backed ARVN fire-
power, the Uprising revealed once again that the government’s political
bankruptcy could not be resolved by brute force alone.
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In a tacit acknowledgment that the military had disappointed the hopeful
crowds of November , Nguyễn Cao Kỳ conceded that the assault on Đà
Nẵng would be followed by elections and a new constitution, offering the
promise of reform in exchange for domestic order, and hoping to shore up
dwindling support from domestic and American constituents, to whom the
regime was increasingly beholden. But behind closed doors in Washington
and Sài Gòn, the elections were regarded as no more than a means of
improving the government’s public image and legalizing the status quo,
strictly intended to consolidate rather than contest the military’s power.
As Ambassador Lodge put it, “the military is the only group which has
experience or competence in managing the country . . . [They] will need to
run the country for some time, and if we give any real power to civilians, the
military will overthrow the government.” Civilian politicians were likewise
under few illusions that the military was sincere in professing to stage an
honest contest. For many observers, the prospect of elections raised at best
measured hopes of a more responsive state, while reviving persistent anxieties
about what, if anything, could succeed the disgraced Ngô Đình Diệm regime.
As the southern Catholic journalist and politician Võ Long Triều recalls:
In the last months and days of the First Republic, many members of the
Catholic intellectual Pax Romana Movement, myself included, were con-
stantly discussing the South’s leadership “crisis,” in which the mass of public
opinion was discontent that the brothers of President Ngô Đình Diệm, Ngô
Đình Nhu and Ngô Đình Cẩn, were enforcing an undemocratic system of
nepotism that had lost the people’s faith . . .However, there were also many
brothers among us who supported President Ngô Đình Diệm, who often
posed the question: “apart from President Ngô Đình Diệm, who is more
worthy of the task of administrating the country?” It was a question that
nobody could answer decisively.
To be sure, Ngô Đình Diệm was far from solely responsible for the
breakdown of the First Republic’s precarious social order. After all, the
overlapping confrontations that exploded during the last days of his rule
and its aftermath reflected deep underlying social schisms, and were orches-
trated by a host of headstrong personalities. Still, as we have seen, Ngô
Đình Diệm’s overbearing response to the Buddhist crisis in particular upset
South Vietnam’s delicate political balance, reviving and intensifying latent
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grievances that would always prove a challenge to redress. Accordingly, as
his successors struggled to restore order, the fallen president, however accu-
rately, came to personify the enduring animosities that his actions had
helped to unleash.
Building the Second Republic
If the  elections then were largely an attempt by the military and the
United States to construct a veneer of legality for the status quo of military
rule, they were also an implicit acknowledgement that political consensus
and an increased sense of popular participation in government were neces-
sary to soothe South Vietnam’s longstanding political, regional and religious
tensions, which had erupted during the final years of Ngô Đình Diệm’s rule.
Still, staging elections was seen as no small gamble in both Washington and
Sài Gòn, tempting the very real possibility that peaceful political competition
could spiral out of control, in turn inviting yet another unpopular military
intervention. We “ought to take out coup insurance against this risk,” one
White House directive pithily suggested. And as the new Constitutional
Assembly [Quốc hội Lập hiến] delegates tasked with drafting election laws
and a new constitution soon discovered, the social fragmentation that accel-
erated during the last year of Ngô Đình Diệm’s reign would continue to
exacerbate the already considerable challenge of creating a new legal frame-
work to put the pieces back together again.
When, on January , , the Assembly presented the Armed Forces
Council [Hội đồng Quân lực] with a preliminary constitution, the draft was
immediately attacked from all sides, with demands at times hinging on what
seemed to American observers like quaint and frivolous objections. Edward
Lansdale, the veteran US operative tasked with overseeing the drafting,
complained of the delegates’ “superstition in the form of the mesmeric
arcane” when delays were caused by “last minute editorial juggling” so that
the phrase “we the people” could be revised to result in a more astrologically
auspicious word count. These dismissive attitudes overlooked, however,
the high degree of imagery and symbolism imbued in the often performative
dialogues between rival political forces in South Vietnam, broadly but by no
means strictly divided along overlapping northern-southern, Catholic-
Buddhist, and pro and anti-military poles.
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Northern Catholic political groups like Nguyễn Gia Hiên’s GSF, for
example, focused their efforts on condemning the deletion of an earlier
reference to a “supreme being” [Đấng Tối cao] from the constitution’s
preamble. After Catholic delegates rejected United Buddhist Association
Director [Viện trưởng Viện Hóa đạo] Thích Tâm Châu’s compromise sug-
gestion of “merciful being” [Đấng Từ bi] for being “too Buddhist,” some
, Catholic protesters surrounded the Assembly on March , demand-
ing that Assembly Chairman Phan Khắc Sửu restore the phrase. Phan Khắc
Sửu, insisting that he was not an atheist, informed them that there was
nothing he could do, as the Assembly would not meet again until April ,
after the constitution was scheduled for promulgation. Instead, he suggested
that the demonstrators confer with the military-led National Leadership
Council [Ủy ban Lãnh đạo Quốc gia] (NLC) responsible for ratifying the
draft, whereupon the crowd headed en masse toward the heavily guarded
Independence Palace, demanding to speak with Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao
Kỳ. Three hours later, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ emerged only to declare that while he
personally had no objection to the phrase “supreme being,” the Assembly
alone had the authority to change the wording of the document—by which
point most of the crowd had grown bored and dispersed. The following
day, a New York Times report on the fracas downplayed the debate over the
preamble’s wording as “typical Vietnamese fondness for the occult.”
But what appeared to many outsiders like a trifling and parochial con-
frontation was actually the latest round of rhetorical jousting for influence
over the constitutional process, played out in the relatively safe realm of
symbolism after both sides drew back from the violence that characterized
the post-Ngô Đình Diệm interregnum. In fact, as Nguyễn Gia Hiên later
explained to a US Embassy officer, the Catholic protesters did not actually
expect their demonstration to change the phrasing of the constitution,
though they nonetheless seized on the occasion to display their determina-
tion, revealing a pragmatic deployment of symbolic protest to stake a claim
for themselves in the new political system. Likewise, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s public
refusal to intercede, the embassy suspected, was most likely little more than
a performative act of defiance meant to mollify military critics opposed even
to the constitution’s token concessions to civilians. Given the conspicuous
arrival of many of the Catholic protesters in ARVN jeeps, the embassy
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concluded, the entire affair had been more spectacle than genuine standoff,
perhaps even pre-arranged to allow both parties to project resolve to their
opponents and constituents.
Nguyễn Gia Hiên’s rivals, on the other hand, were no less adept at employ-
ing allegory to project political intent. During the Assembly’s March 
morning session, on the day when delegates voted on the constitution for the
final time before sending it to the NLC for review, Nguyễn Đắt Dận, repre-
senting the Mekong Delta’s Ba Xuyên Province, opened the proceedings by
invoking the spirit of the assassinated critic of Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Trần Văn Văn.
Then, as one eyewitness recorded, he “unveiled [a] bust of [Trần Văn] Văn
which was placed in front of [the] Speaker’s podium, and implied that to
compromise on transitional arrangements would be [a] betrayal of [Trần
Văn] Văn. Several deputies protested [Nguyễn Đắt] Dận’s demagoguery.”
Arguably South Vietnam’s most prominent southern politician and an
emblem of southern regional identity, Trần Văn Văn had been prone to
speculating about secret northern alliances to control the south between Hà
Nội, the Ngô family, and northern Đại Việts and Catholics. Exaggerated
though they may have been, his suspicions of sinister northern conspiracies
reflected the widespread southern anxiety about northern intentions that had
informed successive Struggle Movement uprisings and contributed to the
delight of the crowds that had turned out to hail the Ngô family’s passing.
It was seen as a near certainty in southern political circles that Trần Văn Văn’s
December ,  assassination had been carried out by the military to silence
Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s most outspoken civilian critic, and the defiant anti-military
and anti-northern implications of Nguyễn Đắt Dận’s performance were obvi-
ous to all present. And though the bust was ordered removed after the
morning session, a group of southern deputies later retrieved it, waiting until
the afternoon’s final vote to once again place it next to a large incense burner
at the front of the hall before pointedly swearing an oath to uphold and defend
the constitution. These acts of competing performative symbolism, con-
ducted by rival political and religious blocs whose mutual antagonism crys-
tallized during the NgôĐình Diệm era, reflect the depth and persistence of the
polarization that the late president helped engender. The struggle for the
constitution, therefore, was the latest salvo in an ongoing regional and reli-
gious struggle.
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With the constitution finally ratified on April , the Assembly turned to
drafting political party legislation in anticipation of the upcoming votes for
a new president, Senate, and Lower House in September and October
respectively. Here too, Ngô Đình Diệm’s toxic legacy would complicate the
already delicate process of reconciling South Vietnam’s bewildering array of
regional and religious axes. Initially scheduled for resolution in the spring of
, Assembly debate on the political parties law lingered well into the
summer, prompting an exasperated US Embassy to recommend using “what
influence we can bring to bear on both the Government and the Assembly to
persuade them to write a good party law” before the election. The primary
obstacle, the Embassy noted, was that “the Vietnamese are . . . familiar with
‘political parties’ which are essentially devices for control of the population.
These include Diem’s National Revolutionary Movement [Phong trào Cách
mạng Quốc gia], Nhu’s Republican Youth [Thanh niên Cộng hòa], and
various communist mass organizations. The Vietnamese . . . know well the
kind of party represented by Ngo Dinh Diem’s Can Lao.”
To alleviate such fears, a  newspaper campaign featured a series of
editorials extolling the need for political parties, both to impose order in the
new electoral system and to organize its hopelessly factionalized anti-
communists against the Communist Party—by some distance South Viet-
nam’s only party with a national grassroots presence. Tự Do [Freedom],
a newspaper known for its northern Catholic sympathies, acknowledged,
for instance, that parties suffered in the eyes of “suspicious people” from the
fact that they “have had a very bad reputation in the past”—a clear reference to
Ngô Đình Diệm’s Cần Lao. “But what was this past if it was not in the hands
of colonialists and dictators?” the paper inquired rhetorically, before insisting
that “the political atmosphere in Vietnam will be lively and bright when there
is an open regime. Vietnamese parties should then cease organizing in secrecy
and in silence. . . .There is no reason to be suspicious of any political party
when one loves democracy and when there is already a worthy regime.”
Lingering suspicions of the Cần Lao were not so easily assuaged, however,
as no less a figure than President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu admitted in November
while contemplating forming a new pro-government party. Although he
“obviously needed the nucleus for a political party to support the govern-
ment,” the president explained to new US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, he
16 F E A R
“did not want it to be identified as his personal instrument in view of the still
fresh memories of Diem and the Can Lao Party.” Instead, Nguyễn Văn
Thiệu opted in the spring of  to assemble the Coalition [Liên minh],
a loose partnership of pro-government groups, insisting again in July that he
“did not want to repeat Diem’s mistakes.” But despite this initial discre-
tion, the looming spectre of a revived Cần Lao meant that even as Nguyễn
Văn Thiệu consolidated power over the Lower House, helped by extensive
bribery funded by the CIA and Presidential Special Assistant Nguyễn Cao
Thăng, it was not until July , , almost two years after the elections,
that the political party statute was finally rammed through the National
Assembly—and then, in spite of many deputies’ grave reservations.
Even more important for holding elections was the Election Law itself,
the subject of an equally heated confrontation in the Assembly throughout
the spring of . Here too, the legislature was roughly divided along
regional and religious lines, with southern deputies rallying behind the
Movement for the Renaissance of the South [Phong trào Phục hưng miền
Nam] (MRS), and northern Catholic and Đại Việt legislators largely sup-
porting the Greater People’s Bloc [Khối Đại chúng] or the much larger pro-
military Democratic Alliance Bloc [Khối Liên minh Dân chủ] led by Nguyễn
Cao Kỳ’s close ally Lê Phước Sang. The subject of particular MRS enmity, Lê
Phước Sang embodied for many southerners the tradition of cronyism and
corruption that had defined the Ngô Đình Diệm regime and its successors.
Faced with the prospect of Lê Phước Sang’s appointment as Assembly
Chairman, deputy Võ Long Triều declared that should the nomination
proceed, he would “resign immediately and apply for Lao citizenship; keep-
ing Vietnamese citizenship with an Assembly Chairman like him would be
too shameful for me to bear.”
Scheduled for passage by the end of the April, the Election Law stalled
when MRS deputies demanded increased campaign funds for prospective
candidates, and runoff provisions in the presidential race to counter what
they saw as a military tactic of dividing votes between as many civilian
candidates as possible. Here the opposition won rare sympathy from the
US Embassy. No doubt overestimating the military’s popularity or, at the
very least, its ability to manipulate results in one-on-one contests against
anti-communist civilians, the United States also advocated run-offs to
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forestall the possibility of secretly communist-backed candidates prevailing
against a divided anti-communist field. But while the opposition success-
fully calculated it could win constitutional concessions by leveraging pres-
sure on Nguyễn Cao Kỳ to present President Lyndon Johnson with an
approved draft of the constitution during their March  meeting in Guam,
the military was determined not to give in when it came to the Election
Law. Eager to maximize already substantial administrative advantages, and
to project resolve to Armed Forces Council hardliners who opposed further
concessions to civilians, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ began applying the stick to deputies
who rejected the covert financial carrots offered to those who supported the
government. In April, MRS-affiliated politicians like Phan Quang Đán
began voicing a litany of allegations against the government, including
threats of physical violence from pro-military deputies, menacing anony-
mous phone-calls, grenades mailed to the houses of MRS members, and
newspapers refusing to publish opposition pieces for fear of government
reprisal. And in the Assembly, “to put further pressure on deputies’ votes”
as MRS member Lý Quí Chung recalls, National Police Chief and Military
Security Service Director Nguyễn Ngọc Loan, one of Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s most
loyal partisans, took to patrolling the balcony during Assembly sessions,
conspicuously brandishing his revolver while imbibing six-packs of beer.
Intimidated but still unbowed, the opposition deputies continued to hold
out. Then, during the May  Assembly session, demonstrators from the
CCB, which had earlier spearheaded the “supreme being” protests, once
again surrounded the Assembly, unfurling anti-opposition banners and
chanting “down with the National Assembly.” Inside the chamber, deputies
abandoned the Election Law debate to take turns denouncing what they
regarded as an obvious military campaign to harass them, eventually forcing
Assembly Chairman Phan Khắc Sửu to adjourn the proceedings. At this
point, the crowd gathered outside attempted to storm the Assembly, smash-
ing windows and kicking down doors before finally being dispersed by riot
police.
Convinced the military was once again employing its favored tactic of
collaborating with sympathetic northern Catholic parties to stage apparently
spontaneous civilian demonstrations, the State Department contemplated
intervening more forcefully. But in the end, having already implicitly warned
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Nguyễn Cao Kỳ not to assassinate prominent civilians like Trần Văn Hương
or Phan Quang Đán, the United States ultimately determined that further
American pressure only risked provoking the military into abandoning the
elections altogether. Tellingly, the State Department, consistently frus-
trated by its inability to choreograph South Vietnamese politics in spite of
massive American military and financial commitments, ordered a study
following the elections to find “ways we can more efficiently exert leverage
on [the] newly elected GVN [Government of Vietnam] to maximize [the]
latter’s performance in [the] post-election period.” Meanwhile, the gov-
ernment made a concerted effort, backed by a radio and newspaper cam-
paign, to crack down on pro-military deputies’ chronic absenteeism from
Assembly sessions. Their absenteeism meant there were not enough pro-
military members in the house to vote in favor of government legislation, and
this was no small factor in the opposition’s successful protracted resistance.
And with these last obstacles removed, the Assembly finally passed the Elec-
tion Law on June , eliminating the run-off provisions, and, in a nod to its
virulently anti-communist supporters, adding the far-reaching Article ()
disqualifying candidates “who have directly or indirectly worked for commu-
nism or pro-communist neutralism or in the interests of communism.”
Meanwhile, though the campaign was not formally scheduled to begin
until August, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ wasted little time instructing Nguyễn Ngọc
Loan to, as the CIA reported, “put into conspicuous action his belief in using
government resources to promote Ky’s bid.” Reports from the countryside
of a wave of threats, harassment, and the demotion or transfer of rival
candidate supporters, among other underhanded tactics, soon reached
the capital, prompting prospective civilian contenders to implore the US
Embassy to intervene to guarantee a fair election. Trần Văn Hương, for
instance, informed Ambassador Bunker that he “kn[ew] for certain that
word-of-mouth orders have gone to province chiefs and district chiefs to
rig the election in favour of Ky and Thieu.” “These and other tactics were
used in the Diem regime,” he continued, “and [I] fear they will be employed
again.” Phan Khắc Sửu, considered a leading civilian candidate along with
Trần Văn Hương, was equally suspicious, informing the embassy that
Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and Nguyễn Văn Thiệu were “pressuring province chiefs
to ensure a heavy vote for their ticket, and General Loan is doing the same to
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provincial police chiefs.” And Hà Thúc Ký, leader of the RevolutionaryĐại
Việt faction [Đại Việt Cách mạng Đảng] (RDV), complained of widespread
withholding of voter registration cards by the military: “even Mai Thọ
Truyền [Trần Văn Hương’s running mate] can’t get his voting card,” he
exclaimed. Although post-election cooperation would be essential, Hà Thúc
Ký continued, “such cooperation would be difficult if [the] election [was] not
honest.” When press censorship was relaxed somewhat on July  (despite
having been officially proscribed by the constitution since April ), an out-
pouring of critical articles followed voicing similar concerns, with Thời Đại
[Time], for instance, asserting that while Trần Văn Hương would surely win
a fair election, “suspicion is justified after experiences acquired from Diem-
style election farces.”
The embassy, still committed to a military victory, publicly downplayed
the allegations while reiterating its official policy of strict non-interference in
the campaign. Behind closed doors however, there was growing concern that
Nguyễn Cao Kỳ was ignoring Ambassador Lodge’s direct April  warning
that “it is important that no one be given any real grounds for complaining
that there had been any abuse of the police power. The Vietnamese people
resent the abuse of police power, and this was perhaps the greatest single
factor in the wave of public emotion against Diem and Nhu in .” No
longer able to deny that the implications of such an obvious reference to the
manner of Ngô Đình Diệm’s demise had failed to produce the desired effect,
Ambassador Bunker informed President Johnson on June  that “Loan has
begun systematically summoning police and military security officers from
throughout the country in order to instruct them on how to assure that Ky is
elected.”
Before it had even formally begun then, the election had already lost
much of its credibility in the eyes of the civilian opposition, the very people
whose loyalties the entire exercise had been intended to recover. “Nobody
believed the election would be carried out honestly,” Lý Quí Chung recalled.
At best it amounted to “a chance for people opposed to the government
to express our points of view, and apply stronger pressure against military
dictatorship and the war.” In relying so heavily on what were widely referred
to as “NgôĐình Diệm-style” tactics, the military had effectively brought South
Vietnamese politics full circle. The generals who one eyewitness records as
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having been “hailed as heroes [and] greeted as saviours of the country” for
eliminating Ngô Đình Diệm were now regarded as perpetuating the very
system they had once been lauded for dismantling. And the election, once
conceived as the centerpiece of a campaign to reconcile competing anti-
communist factions, now seemed like merely a continuation of their struggle,
reinforcing rather than resolving the country’s acute polarization.
That civilian politicians so reviled the military’s “Diệmist” tactics and that
they invoked Ngô Đình Diệm’s memory so readily in condemning them was
perhaps to be expected given that the list of aspiring candidates read like
a roll call of men who had endured considerable personal suffering for
having dared to oppose the late president. Of the seventeen joint presi-
dent/vice presidential tickets filed for Assembly approval on July , three
men—Phan Khắc Sửu, Trần Văn Hương and Trần Văn Lý—had been
imprisoned for signing the Caravelle Manifesto. Phan Khắc Sửu and his
running-mate Phan QuangĐán had then been subject to beatings and water
and electrical torture, and it was for this reason that “speaking very confi-
dentially,” Trần Văn Hương informed the embassy, “Suu would be a terrible
president. [He] was imprisoned and beaten during his long years as a revo-
lutionary leader, and he is now fuzzy in the head.” For their efforts on
behalf of the Đại Việt and Nationalist Parties [Việt Nam Quốc dân Đảng]
respectively, candidates Hà Thúc Ký and Vũ Hồng Khanh had also been
imprisoned under Ngô Đình Diệm, as had Ngô Đình Nhu’s one-time lawyer
Trương Đình Dzu, disbarred and arrested in  on what was widely
regarded as a politically motivated charge of writing a bad check after
running against Ngô Đình Diệm in the National Assembly. Another attor-
ney, Dương Văn Minh’s running-mate Trần Ngọc Liễng, had served as
defense lawyer to many of Ngô Đình Diệm’s aforementioned political pris-
oners. Other candidates in  included Phạm Huy Cơ, who had led
a delegation of Phan Quang Đán’s Free Democratic Party [Đảng Tự do Dân
chủ] to foreign capitals seeking assistance in removing Ngô Đình Diệm;
Nguyễn Đình Luyện, Minister of Health in the  rebels’ abortive anti-
Ngô Đình Diệm cabinet; Âu Trường Thanh, who had advocated overthrow-
ing both Ngô Đình Diệm and Hồ Chí Minh in favor of a “neutralist” [trung
lập] government; and Hoàng Cơ Bình, who lost his dental practice after
signing the  rebels’ manifesto, albeit for very a different reason—his
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frustration over Ngô Đình Diệm’s failure to attempt the “liberation” of the
North by force—than his colleagues.
More surprising perhaps was the similar manner in which Ngô Đình
Diệm featured in the rhetoric of Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s main military rival, the
titular Chair of the NLC Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. Circumspect and calculating
where Nguyễn Cao Kỳwas flamboyant and spontaneous, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
appealed to conservatives repelled by Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s brash attitude and
playboy persona, though he was regarded as enjoying less support within
ARVN than his competitor. As it grew clear early in  that a self-
administered victory for the military was forthcoming, speculation turned
instead to whether Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and Nguyễn Văn Thiệu would field rival
presidential tickets, or whether ARVN would settle the confrontation by
internally appointing one of the rival generals to serve as its official repre-
sentative. Undoubtedly, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s surreptitious groundwork in the
countryside had been intended at least as much to gain a head start in
thwarting Nguyễn Văn Thiệu as to promote his own prospects. This set the
stage for a tense June  encounter between Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Ambas-
sador Bunker, wherein the general, “with considerable emotion,” Ambassa-
dor Bunker recorded, excoriated his colleague’s “attempted use of some
members of the armed forces such as General Tri [Nguyễn Bảo Trị] and
General Thang [Nguyễn Đức Thắng] in support of his candidacy, the fla-
grant abuse of censorship, and General Loan’s activities.”Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
“then went on at some length,” the ambassador reported, “to stress his view
of the imperative need for fair and honest elections if the people were to have
confidence in the government. Otherwise . . . there would be a return to the
days of Diem and eventually there would be another coup.” Well aware of
mounting American media criticism of Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s campaign excesses,
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu made his remarks, in part, as a bid to portray himself as
a savvier and more responsible alternative to his impetuous rival, and as
a statesman who understood the importance of curating South Vietnam’s
image for constituents both at home and abroad. But in referring so pointedly
to his predecessor’s demise, the aspiring president was also raising the stakes
by shrewdly employing the embassy’s own tactic of invoking Ngô Đình
Diệm’s fate to levy veiled but unmistakable warnings. Given the turbulent
post-Ngô Đình Diệm interregnum, which prompted a by-now-overarching
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US commitment to avoid extra-legal changes of government at all costs, such
coup speculation could hardly be dismissed as an idle threat.
This latest salvo in the generals’ feud came amid growing ARVN fears
that forcibly retired general Dương Văn Minh, whose effective captivity in
Bangkok “violates [the] language of [the] constitution and electoral law,” as
Ambassador Bunker put it, would attempt to force his way back to Sài Gòn
to contest the military for the presidency. Unlike the other civilian candi-
dates, men unknown to the vast majority of South Vietnam’s mostly rural
population, Dương Văn Minh enjoyed national prominence and consider-
able prestige. His esteemed reputation stemmed almost entirely from pop-
ular association as the symbol of anti-Ngô family resistance, and it persisted
in spite of his own deposal, forced retirement, and exile shortly thereafter.
A southern Buddhist vocal in supporting peace initiatives, Dương Văn Minh
functioned as an iconic opposite of Ngô Đình Diệm and his military suc-
cessors, and he was held to be the only figure with sufficient stature to unite
South Vietnam’s chronically factionalized opposition. Accordingly, through-
out the Second Republic, he was courted by successive opposition operatives
hoping to harness his popularity to advance their political ambitions. Few of
these men, however, had much regard for Dương VănMinh’s administrative
abilities, preferring to enlist him as something of a cipher whom they could
deploy on their behalf from behind the scenes. Trần VănĐôn, one of Dương
Văn Minh’s most outspoken public backers, admitted privately for instance
that as president, his protégé would be “hopeless,” claiming that “even those
who supported Minh were fearful of the consequences if he were elected.”
And yet if anything, Dương Văn Minh’s lasting appeal despite these per-
ceived deficiencies only underlines his symbolic value as an emblem of
southern Buddhist opposition to the Ngô family and its supporters, corre-
spondingly demonstrating once again the depth and persistence of resent-
ment for the Ngô Đình Diệm regime. Certainly, for the increasingly reviled
military, the extensive popular admiration for Dương Văn Minh posed an
acute threat to the Election Law strategy of exploiting the opposition’s
otherwise insurmountable fragmentation.
With the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ-Nguyễn Văn Thiệu rivalry and the Dương Văn
Minh question coming to a head as the July  deadline to file candidacies
approached, the military called a top-secret summit for its highest-ranking
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officers at the end of June. The generals quickly determined that Dương Văn
Minh could not be permitted to return from Thailand, with Chairman of the
Joint General Staff Cao Văn Viên formally requesting on July  that the
National Assembly disbar his candidacy on the grounds that he posed
a National Security threat. The tactic broke down however, because,
as Central Election Council member Lý Văn Hiệp explained, “the complaint
by Vien . . . has not been backed up by further statements, reasons, or doc-
uments . . . and the military has not explained what it means by ‘National
Security.’” Instead, against a backdrop of vitriolic editorials in northern
Catholic newspapers demanding Dương Văn Minh’s exclusion, the military
seized on a technicality, requesting that his candidacy be eliminated due to
running mate Trần Ngọc Liễng’s alleged former French citizenship, a viola-
tion of Article  of the constitution stating that candidates could not have
held any citizenship except Vietnamese since birth. On July , with
Nguyễn Ngọc Loan again patrolling the National Assembly balcony while
liberally imbibing, the military-sponsored Democratic Alliance Bloc turned
out in full strength to ratify Dương Văn Minh’s disqualification. Behind the
scenes, despite public professions of impartiality, the embassy signaled its
approval of Dương Văn Minh’s admittedly unconstitutional detention, not-
ing that “the opposition of both the leading military figures and the Catho-
lics [to Dương Văn Minh’s candidacy] suggests that a ‘Big’ Minh victory
could put us back in the atmosphere of –.”
Meanwhile, though not formally on the ARVN summit agenda, the
Nguyễn Cao Kỳ-Nguyễn Văn Thiệu rivalry remained an elephant in the
room throughout the Dương Văn Minh deliberations. Events unexpectedly
reached a crisis—complete with bitter accusations, denunciations, and tears
—when III Corps Chief and Nguyễn Cao Kỳ loyalist Lê Nguyên Khang
revealed that in light of his patron’s underhanded campaign tactics, his
support for Nguyễn Cao Kỳ had wavered. ARVN top brass seized on the
shift in momentum, imposing a resolution whereby Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu would contest the election together on a joint president-
vice presidential ticket, with the latter supplanting the former as the mili-
tary’s choice for president. The resulting all-military slate, an outcome
described earlier by the White House as a “disaster” to be avoided at all
costs, once again complicated the prevailing interpretation among South
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Vietnamese political observers like Lý Quí Chung that “whichever candidate
the United States chose would of course be elected president.”
Elevated to ARVN heir apparent pending the inevitable administration of
his election, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu faced a barrage of media criticism over the
military’s obvious intervention against Dương Văn Minh, complete with
familiar comparisons to the dark days of Ngô Đình Diệm. Nguyễn Ngọc
Loan was subject to particular disdain, with pro-southern Tiếng Vang [Echo]
condemning his “intimidation of the Assembly” by, as Sống [Life] colorfully
put it, reminding legislators that “they could be rounded up and sent to
Pleiku for a rest.” In response, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu addressed accusations of
Catholic partisanship during an August  press conference by citing his
assault on NgôĐình Diệm’s palace as proof of his religious impartiality. This
marked the emergence of November  as a recurring campaign issue,
employed in subsequent elections by candidates of all persuasions as rhe-
torical shorthand to position themselves on either side of South Vietnam’s
indelible regional and religious divides.
Of course, invoking Ngô Đình Diệm’s ouster as evidence of patriotism
hardly endeared Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to northern Catholic Ngô family loy-
alists, though by now the GSF had already committed the votes it controlled
to supporting the ARVN slate. Other Catholic groups, however, were yet to
be persuaded. Nguyễn Ngọc Biên, leader of the CCB in Bình Thuận where
some thirty thousand Catholics resided, complained to a US Embassy
contact that the GSF had been “bought off” by the military. He said his
followers would instead “follow our conscience,” which in Nguyễn Ngọc
Biên’s case meant siding with southern Buddhist Trần Văn Hương, who
he saw as “sympathetic to Catholic interest[s] and, just as important, free of
any of the taint of corruption which surrounds the present government.”
Moreover, Nguyễn Ngọc Biên explained, “a Catholic president won’t work—
too many people remember Ngô Đình Diệm.” Rather than make his alle-
giance public, Nguyễn Ngọc Biên confided that he would instead mount
a covert word-of-mouth campaign on Trần Văn Hương’s behalf, to avoid
“difficulties with the authorities.”
As expected though, ARVN overcame these reservations on Election
Day, securing victory—albeit with just  percent of the vote—despite vast
financial and administrative advantages, and rampant electoral fraud. The
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big surprise was a runner-up finish for Trương Đình Dzu, who shrewdly
waited until after his candidacy was approved before launching an effective
and resonant radio campaign calling for immediate peace talks with the
communists. Prosecuted immediately after the election on currency trading
charges dating back to  (which even the embassy regarded as politically
motivated), Trương Đình Dzu was again placed under indefinite “protective
custody,” as Nguyễn Văn Thiệu put it, following the  Tết Offensive, and
formally charged three months later with advocating contact with the
National Liberation Front. Both instances resulted in waves of protest in
the United States, and served to further delegitimize the new constitutional
system in the eyes of many South Vietnamese.
Carried out in the challenging context of a brutal ongoing war, the
outcome of the election was mixed at best. At the very least, it had “legiti-
mized, legalized and civilianized the old military regime,” Trần Văn Tuyên
posited in Chính Luận [Political Discussion] newspaper, and provided
a basis for bringing an end to the chaos that, “because there had been no
relationship between the government and the people,” had characterized the
past four years. Other observers however, such as Senate candidate and
future Ambassador-to-Laos Hoàng Cơ Thụy, were skeptical of even this
basic feat: “the constitution of , adopted under Diem, was a very rea-
sonable document in itself,” he pointed out, “but, as used by Diem, it became
an instrument of an authoritarian government.” While he had “every hope
for the new constitution,” Hoàng Cơ Thụy was “more concerned over the
manner in which it is applied by Vietnamese leaders in the future.” And
when it came to the fundamental problem of political polarization, even the
more sanguine Trần Văn Tuyên harbored grave doubts. “President Ngô
Đình Diệm’s biggest and most basic mistake,” he wrote, “was not knowing
how to unite national forces . . . the prerequisite condition for success in any
undertaking.” “I am not optimistic,” he continued, “like those who say that if
we have a constitution and an assembly, we can have democracy and if we
have a popularly elected regime, we can have peace . . . I worry that this
Second Republic is deficient at its very beginning and that its existence is
seriously threatened at its very birth.”
Conceived in part as a means of reconciling anti-communist South Viet-
nam’s complex overlapping regional and religious poles, the election was
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nearly undone by the very tensions it had been intended to resolve, if
anything serving to aggravate rather than alleviate Catholic-Buddhist and
civilian-military rivalries. Unsurprising for an exercise contested by factions
that emerged and largely defined themselves in response to Ngô Đình
Diệm’s divisive rule, pro- and especially anti-Diệmist allegory and rhetoric
and featured heavily, with candidates positioning themselves by invoking
competing interpretations of his legacy. A Chính Luận commenter, for
instance, described a country cleaved between those who “wanted order
after the chaos that followed November , ,” and those who “feared
dictatorship . . . and were compelled to find a way to prevent the recurrence
of a second [Ngô Đình] Diệm.” The Second Republic, he proposed,
amounted to a series of symbolic concessions to the latter camp: “Did [Ngô
Đình] Diệm connive at corruption and abuse? In that case, we have a watch-
dog with broad powers to eradicate corruption . . .Did he stifle freedom of
speech? Then censorship must be avoided, at least regarding the press.” In
turn, voter expectations and reactions were likewise conditioned by impres-
sions of Ngô Đình Diệm and his government. As the  campaign to
restore legitimacy and constitutional rule reveals, South Vietnamese politics
in the Second Republic were dominated by the former president’s looming
posthumous presence, with ongoing debates about his memory mirrored in
the basic configuration of its polarized political scene. Of course, it would
take more than a shoddily rigged election to overcome such entrenched
hostilities, but, as Trần Văn Tuyên wearily concluded, “in the midst of the
current political chaos, having something in hand is better than void and
nothingness.”
The Neo-Cần Lao and the Ngô Đình Diệm Revival
Either content to back the military or wary of a triggering a backlash by
selecting another Catholic president, Catholic organizations instead devoted
their efforts to the concurrent Senate election, somewhat obscured by the
clamor surrounding the heated presidential campaign. Taking advantage of
a hopelessly divided field (with forty-eight ten-member slates competing for
six places), an Ấn Quang election boycott, and a disciplined parish-level
network that could deliver mass turnout for pre-approved candidates,
northern Catholic groups succeeded in electing all three of their sponsored
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slates, along with a largely northern sympathetic fourth list fronted by the
RDV’s Nguyễn Ngọc Kỳ. So decisive was the victory that some prominent
northern Catholics such as Xây Dựng [Construction] newspaper publisher
Nguyễn Quang Lâm “seemed even a little embarrassed” by the results, the
Embassy recorded. “Two Catholic slates would really have been enough,
three would have been just right, but four are a bit too much, posing poten-
tial danger to the ‘equilibrium of the nation,’” he reportedly remarked,
noting that he had already “counseled Catholic senators against forming
a bloc in the Upper House.” Eager to avoid provoking lingering Ngô Đình
Diệm-era sensitivities to perceived Catholic conspiracies, Nguyễn Quang
Lâm also published a series of editorials insisting that there had been noth-
ing sinister about the Catholic slates’ good showing.
The publisher’s calls for restraint would go largely unheeded, however,
with his colleagues in the legislature proving rather less judicious in exer-
cising their new powers. As Nguyễn Văn Thiệu assumed the presidency, his
position remained far from secure, with Vice President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ still
enjoying considerable sympathy within the military, and with much of the
civilian opposition too distressed by the nature of ARVN’s victory to con-
sider cooperating with the president. Calculating that the United States
would not accept another military coup (which effectively eliminated
Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s primary means of recourse), Nguyễn Văn Thiệu initially
opted to court the northern Catholic-dominated National Assembly, helping
to enhance his image as a sober, responsible statesman who respected the
new constitution. But the informal northern Catholic bloc that controlled
the Upper House was determined to exact a substantial price in exchange for
their support, leveraging Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s initial weakness into political
capital, which they wielded against a succession of politicians they regarded
as either too southern or too soft on communism.
The first to fall at the Senate’s behest was Prime Minister Nguyễn Văn
Lộc, a southern Nguyễn Cao Kỳ supporter whose appointment had been
something of consolation prize for the embattled vice president. Pressured
into resigning to pre-empt a no-confidence vote in the Assembly, Nguyễn
Văn Lộc was replaced in May  by former presidential candidate Trần
Văn Hương, in a bid by Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to extend an olive branch to
the restive southern opposition. Instead, the appointment—a “heavy
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disappointment,” according to Lý Quí Chung—had the opposite effect of
utterly discrediting Trần Văn Hương among southern political observers,
with even his former campaign manager Võ Long Triều dismissing him as
“an old man with ambition but no knowledge . . .who understood nothing
about the political situation in the south.” Worse still, the appointment of
a second consecutive southern prime minister engendered significant
resentment among northern political groups. In a December  conver-
sation with an embassy source, Trần Vỹ and Lê Trọng Quát, both former
Ngô Đình Diệm-era officials and current Nhân Xã Party members, warned
that Trần Văn Hương’s cabinet “consists largely of technicians with no
political identity, and Huong’s personal cronies.” Should the prime minister
fail to implement a “broadening of the cabinet to include real nationalist
elements like the Nhân Xã, Revolutionary Đại Việts, [and] northern Catho-
lics,” Lê Trọng Quát continued, “nationalist political elements will have no
choice but to strive for Huong’s removal, which they could bring about
within six months.” As it turned out, Lê Trọng Quát had overestimated
the northern parties’ political strength—but only by two months. On August
, , amid mounting Assembly attacks against the prime minister,
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu requested Trần Văn Hương’s resignation, replacing him
with retired general Trần Thiện Khiêm and bringing the fleeting era of
civilian prime ministers to an abrupt end.
Even former NgôĐình Diệm-era officials were not spared the Assembly’s
wrath, particularly in the Foreign Ministry which, in a bid to improve South
Vietnam’s belligerent image abroad, had started to issue tentative peace
positions intended mainly for international consumption. Trần Văn Đỗ,
serving his second stint as foreign minister (a post he had held earlier until
), was excoriated by Assembly militants after suggesting that the gov-
ernment regard negotiations with the NLF as an internal matter, similar, he
noted, to how Ngô Đình Diệm had managed the Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài
religious groups. Accused in the Senate of “creating difficulties for the
Assembly in rousing the spirit of the people,” “committing a sin against the
nation and the people,” and “[being] confused like a little child,” Trần Văn
Đỗ was ultimately forced from office in May . A Caravelle Manifesto
signatory however, he had undoubtedly always been suspect in the eyes of
the northern Catholic-controlled Senate.
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His replacement, Trần Chánh Thành, on the other hand, was not only
a former Cần Lao member but also the architect of Ngô Đình Diệm’s
notoriously excessive “Denounce the Communists” [Tố cộng] Campaign.
But despite impeccable anti-Communist credentials, Trần Chánh Thành
was also quickly targeted for parliamentary censure after redoubling his
predecessor’s efforts by calling for a “policy of presence” in neglected neutral
countries like France, Cambodia, Indonesia and India before the Vietnam
Council on Foreign Relations, a new information service established to
promote South Vietnam abroad and counter the communists’ global public
relations success. Trần Chánh Thành countered by successfully charging
Tự Do [Freedom] publisher PhạmViệt Tuyền with libel for printing Senator
Trương Tiến Đạt’s allegation that he was “a senior member of the Commu-
nity Party.” But his July ,  suggestion to foreign journalists that
non-communist NLF members could theoretically participate in elections
without contravening Article  of the Constitution (prohibiting “every activ-
ity designed to publicize or carry out Communism”) prompted renewed
Assembly accusations that he was making “concession after concession”
to the other side. Replaced with more lasting effect in August  by
another former Cần Lao member, Senator Trần Văn Lắm, Trần Chánh
Thành represented yet another victim of the relentless hyper-partisanship
that plagued the early Second Republic.
Even the shock of the  Tết Offensive brought only a brief respite
from the bitter sectarian infighting, with an initial wave of anti-communist
solidarity inspiring South Vietnam’s parties and political groups to explore
methods of uniting against the suddenly immediate communist threat. But
as the violence gradually subsided, so too did the impetus for political
cooperation. The fledgling coalitions that emerged in response to the Tết
Offensive quickly aligned along familiar partisan axes, amounting to little
more than loosely organized rival blocs replicating established competing
political constellations. Thus, when Trần Văn Đôn invited the GSF to join
his National Salvation Front [Mặt trận Dân tộc Cứu nguy] coalition, Nguyễn
Gia Hiên refused because, as he reportedly explained to a CIA asset, “no
Catholics can participate in a political organization that includes An Quang
Buddhists . . . [and] that includes among its officers General Mai Huu Xuan,
who killed former President Diem.” Instead, the GSF opted along with the
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RDV and Nhân Xã parties to enter Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s pro-government
National Social Democratic Front [Mặt trận Quốc gia Dân chủ Xã hội]
(NSDF), likewise established in response to the Tết Offensive, hoping to
secure cabinet positions and other attendant powers and privileges assumed
to be on offer as rewards for supporting the president. Predictably, the
formation of a state-sponsored front dominated by northern Catholic par-
ties led to renewed fears of “Diệmist” politics, with even PrimeMinister Trần
Thiện Khiêm warning of the perils should the NSDF be perceived as “a semi-
clandestine pro-government organization along the lines of the Can Lao.”
And sure enough, a spurned Trần Văn Đôn seized on the symbolic occasion
of South Vietnam’s National Day [Ngày Quốc Khánh] (the November 
anniversary of Ngô Đình Diệm’s ouster) to warn against Buddhist alien-
ation, echoing his complaints to the US Embassy that the NSDF was com-
promised from the start by excluding “the people who made the coup against
Diem in  . . . and the most important religious element in the country,
the Buddhists.”
It was in this atmosphere of persistent sectional antagonism that the
Nhân Xã Party made its debut on the South Vietnamese political scene.
Though not the only political organization led by former Cần Lao partisans
—indeed, Nguyễn Gia Hiên regarded rumored initiatives by Foreign Min-
ister Trần Văn Lắm and former Ngô Đình Diệm-era intelligence director
Trần Kim Tuyến as much greater threats than Nhân Xã to the primacy of the
GSF—Nhân Xã stood out as the sole party that explicitly promoted Ngô
Đình Diệm in its imagery and rhetoric.Unveiled at Sài Gòn’s Thống Nhất
Theatre on April , , Nhân Xã was the product of years of planning by
a number of former Ngô Đình Diệm-era notables, including former Cabinet
Minister Trương Công Cừu (the concurrent Chair of the NSDF Policy and
Planning Committee); Nguyễn Văn Thuận, the Bishop of Nha Trang and
the late president’s nephew; and wealthy pharmacists La Thành Nghệ
and Ngô Khắc Tỉnh, the latter, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s uncle, serving as Min-
ister of Information and later, Education.
Although an unnamed Party spokesman denied in the English-language
Saigon Post newspaper that Nhân Xã represented “a rebirth of the former
Can Lao Party,” his remarks, the US Embassy noted, “will not be widely
believed, as it is already fairly common knowledge in Saigon that Nhan
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Xa . . . reflects at least one faction of Can Lao leadership.” After all, Nhân
Xã Party material bore the familiar red and green of the Cần Lao, and its
organizational structure, dominated by former Cần Lao members, borrowed
extensively from the Cần Lao model of clandestine cells and secret internal
hierarchies, employing its forerunner’s tactic of covertly infiltrating existing
institutions to achieve de facto control. Thus, “appear[ing] to take consid-
erable satisfaction in renewed activity by former (or present) Can Lao,”
Presidential Special Assistant (and former Cần Lao member) Nguyễn Cao
Thăng boasted to an embassy source that “every political organization worth
its salt today . . . has Can Lao elements. This is simply because only the Can
Lao have genuine grassroots organization.” Even the Nhân Xã Party
name, which can be translated roughly as “Social Humanist Party,” was an
obvious allusion to Personalism [Nhân Vị], the Ngô Đình Diệm regime’s
guiding ideology.
After staging a series of more modest regional ceremonies to complement
the Sài Gòn inauguration, and establishing two newspapers, Thời Báo
[Times], and later, Độc Lập [Independence] to promote its efforts to revive
the Diệmist brand, Nhân Xã set its sights on the  Senate Election as
a springboard for reclaiming official government sponsorship. Meanwhile,
no doubt interpreting his  Ministry of Information appointment as
a signal that the Party enjoyed his nephew’s good graces, Ngô Khắc Tỉnh
hastened to exploit his presidential connections by filling the Ministry’s
ranks with Nhân Xã partisans. This prompted Ministry Director of Training
Phạm Xuân Nùng to complain to a CIA contact about the Party’s “plans to
use the [Ministry’s] training courses to train Vietnam Information Service
employees so that when they return to their provincial offices, they can act
mainly as Nhan Xa cadres and form the Party’s provincial organizations.”
Despite significant state resources at its disposal however, the  Election
was a disappointment for the Party, which found itself crowded out by a wide
array of more-established northern Catholic competitors and unable even to
unite behind a single Nhân Xã ticket. Ngô Khắc Tỉnh’s list finished a distant
fourth (amid rumors of covert government support), falling well short of
securing one of three available places, while Trương Công Cừu’s slate man-
aged only an eighth place showing. But if a frustrating  campaign
revealed the limitations of overtly emulating the largely disgraced Cần Lao
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brand, Nhân Xã’s publicization of NgôĐình Diệm’s image was an altogether
different matter. And in fostering the poignant November  anniversary of
Ngô Đình Diệm’s death (one day after the much more equivocal occasion of
National Day celebrated his deposal) Nhân Xã’s bid to redeem the late
president came to fleeting fruition in , testament to the complexity of
his legacy even as the anti-Catholic anxieties that emerged during his final
years in office were again on the rise.
Before , the graves of Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother Ngô Đình
Nhu had been unmarked and scarcely attended save for a small crowd of
Ngô family friends and relatives who assembled annually on November .
The  commemorations—which, as we have seen, drew large, emotional
crowds to the cemetery and the Sài Gòn Cathedral—appeared to emerge
almost spontaneously, surprising many observers with their intensity, and
prompting much local and overseas media speculation about what a Diệmist
revival might portend. In fact, the  memorial represented the culmi-
nation of a long behind-the-scenes campaign by a Nhân Xã organizing
committee led by Party Chairman Trương Công Cừu. November , 
witnessed the first Nhân Xã-sponsored Ngô Đình Diệm memorial, and by
, the Party was attracting high-profile guests like First Lady Nguyễn Thị
Mai Anh (a Mekong Delta Catholic), and official support from the Catholic
Church and a host of Catholic political organizations. In October ,
Nhân Xã established a multi-partisan Ngô Đình Diệm Memorial Commit-
tee, recruiting powerful allies including the GSF and the Vietnamese Con-
federation of Labor [Confédération Vietnamienne du Travail], headed by
staunch Ngô Đình Diệm supporter and former Cần Lao executive Trần
Quốc Bửu. The Committee was chaired by Father Nguyễn Văn Thịnh, who
revealed to a CIA source that he “hope[d] the Diem Memorial Committee
will form the basis for a permanent political organization which would play
a paramount role in Vietnamese life in the near future . . . [and] perhaps lead
to the formation of a permanent alliance whose guiding spirit would be the
life of President Diem.” Undoubtedly a factor in the wildly successful
 Sài Gòn commemorations, these influential partnerships also enabled
Nhân Xã to expand its efforts beyond the capital by staging concurrent
memorials in Đà Nẵng, Nha Trang and Xuân Lộc. But while the 
event was rather less spontaneous that it appeared, the size and diversity of
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the crowds, which caused severe traffic congestion in Sài Gòn, clearly
exceeded the limited reach of Trương Công Cừu and his colleagues alone.
How then to account for this intense but ultimately short-lived Diệm
revival?
We must first recall that in , South Vietnam was a very different
country than the one forcibly bequeathed by Ngô Đình Diệm in . The
escalation of the war and the deployment of millions of American soldiers
beginning in  had ushered in a profound transformation of South
Vietnamese society. Hoping to foster popular support for the war effort, the
United States subsidized a large-scale commodity import program, intro-
ducing a wealth of consumer goods but also disrupting the country’s eco-
nomic balance, resulting in rampant corruption, profiteering, and chronic
inflation, which devastated South Vietnam’s substantial fixed-income class.
Meanwhile, as the war in the countryside intensified—roughly four times
more bomb tonnage was dropped on South Vietnam than North Vietnam
between  and —millions of displaced rural South Vietnamese fled
to the cities for shelter, overwhelming local authorities and generating severe
traffic, sanitation and poverty concerns. By , the US Embassy reck-
oned, Sài Gòn had become the most densely populated settlement in the
world, plagued by “generalized urban discontent caused by rising prices,
overcrowding and inadequate public services, and frictions on the political
scene,” which rendered the city “more volatile than it has been for some
time.” A piece by Nguyễn Đình Thiều in Sống (arrayed beside a photo-
spread showing pornography stalls on Lê Lợi Street) rechristened the city
“Sàighềnh” [maelstrom], describing its jarring transition from charming
capital to squalid metropolis, replete with swindlers, gangs, addicts and
thieves. , the author proclaimed, was the “year of ‘cave’ [slang for
‘prostitute’] inflation” [Sài Gòn  là năm lạm phát cave]. Meanwhile,
nationalist South Vietnamese of all stripes recoiled in horror at the infusion
of American culture, luxury goods and largesse. As the prominent southern
Catholic intellectual Lý Chánh Trung affectingly observed:
The dominance of the American Empire, under the guise of national sover-
eignty, has a profoundly and comprehensively different character than the
dominance of classical empires. It can deface even the very soul of a people . . .
The day that the people of the South accept America’s permanent “defense of
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our freedom” is the day when our freedom can only be a prefabricated free-
dom produced in America and imported here under the brands “Coca” or
“Pepsi” Cola. We will have a Pepsi system, Pepsi government, Pepsi education,
Pepsi culture. We will have the freedom to starve and the freedom to fatten
our bellies drinking Pepsi-Cola-a-go-go! Whoever dreams of a future like that
for our country can go ahead and dream. But as for me, because I don’t know
how to drink Pepsi-Cola, I think that: the Americans can donate any kind of
object, but they cannot donate freedom. Freedom cannot be an aid com-
modity. There is no Pepsi-Cola freedom!
Lý Chánh Trung’s remarks reveal another feature of the Second
Republic—spiralling war-weariness and anti-Americanism among even
staunchly anti-communist South Vietnamese. “Our peasants,” wrote Infor-
mation Minister Tôn Thất Thiện, “will remember their cratered rice fields
and defoliated forests, devastated by an alien air force that seems at war with
the very land of Vietnam. Villagers will remember their hamlets uprooted
from the earth, all to no purpose. And our city dwellers and intellectuals will
mark how, while saving Vietnam, a half-million American soldiers are suf-
focating it with their fantastic wealth, their gadgetry, their promiscuous
virility, and their destructive innocence.” This widespread consternation
over American political, economic and cultural dominance was aggravated
by recurring incidents where US soldiers shot or ran down Vietnamese
pedestrians while driving past them. In the Central Vietnamese town of Quy
Nhơn, the December ,  killing of a high-school student by errant
gunfire from a passing US truck sparked two days of student riots, forcing
local officials to declare a curfew and deploy the provincial militia to restore
order. Scarcely a month later, a second Quy Nhơn teenager was fatally shot
on January  by a stray bullet from American troops tasked with sinking
contaminated food cans with rifle fire. January  saw a local schoolteacher
gunned down by a soldier from the rd Airborne Brigade, and on Feb-
ruary , two more Quy Nhơn children were shot to death by passing Amer-
ican troops. Three days later, a second round of rioting kicked off in the city,
with a series of mobs, each several thousand strong, surrounding the Pro-
vincial Headquarters; placing the deceased children’s coffins in the province
chief’s office; torching the entire fleet at a US transport depot; overturning
and igniting two American buses to immobilize the Quy Nhơn airfield; and
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blockading the highway and threatening to burn any approaching US
vehicles.
While Quy Nhơn was perhaps especially misfortunate, its experience was
hardly unique. In Huế, after two Vietnamese youths were shot dead by US
troops in September , hundreds of students marched through the city
carrying banners demanding immediate US withdrawal, Nguyễn Văn
Thiệu’s resignation, and condemning “Bloodthirsty Americans.” One US
Jeep was burned, an American reporter was pelted with stones, and Viet-
namese police were confronted by students hurling Molotov cocktails. That
same week saw US vehicles in Quảng Ngãi surrounded by South Vietnamese
veterans demanding cash payments and prisoner releases, while an Amer-
ican security guard who broke a disabled veteran’s wooden arm during
a confrontation in Đà Nẵng found himself swarmed by dozens of fellow
veterans, who pulled the pins from their grenades until their comrade was
promised compensation. Reports of anti-American outbursts in the pro-
vinces often prompted sympathy demonstrations in the capital, where
American property, vehicles and installations were by now routinely set
upon by bands of Molotov-wielding students. “Anti-American demonstra-
tions always are the easiest to organize,” the traditionally conservative Law
School Board’s Vũ Ngọc Lộc confided to an embassy source, because “no
student will defend the Americans in front of his colleagues.” In response,
the US military convened a Command Safety Council in December ,
distributing memos “re-emphasizing the prohibition on indiscriminate fir-
ing of weapons,” and affirming that “vehicle driving safety is one of the areas
of concentration . . . in improving US-Vietnamese relations.” But by
autumn  the situation had grown so severe that a fact-finding mission
led by Deputy National Security Advisor Alexander Haig advised: “another
reason for accelerating US redeployments is the threat posed by anti-
American incidents.”
Against this backdrop of immense civilian casualties, inflation, corrup-
tion, squalor, and the proliferation of social vices such as drug abuse and
prostitution, the Ngô Đình Diệm era, when considered in hindsight,
acquired a powerful nostalgic appeal, reminding people of a simpler time
when “the war was small and distant, the Piastre [VNĐ] more valuable, and
Americans scarce,” as one observer put it. In a similar manner, the late
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president himself could be recast from aloof, nepotistic autocrat to paragon
of a vanishing moral order. Famously unmarried, and by all accounts
a devout, even austere figure seen to have personally abstained from the
temptations that discredited his more permissive entourage, NgôĐình Diệm
re-emerged during the Second Republic exuding a welcome aura of rectitude
and propriety during a period of turbulence and decay.
His budding revival was bolstered by two publications in the spring of
. The first, Làm thế nào để giết một tổng thống [How to Kill a President]
by Cao Thế Dung and Lương Khải Minh (widely known to be a pseudonym
for former intelligence director Trần Kim Tuyến), revisited the events lead-
ing up to the fateful  coup, drawing heavily on subsequent disclosures in
the Western press. Noting the recent tension between a “movement actively
advocating the restoration of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime” and those who
saw “restoration of former President Diệm’s honor as . . . a public negation
of the meaning of November ,  . . . a day of revolution and pride,” the
pair ultimately sided with the latter: “restoring the NgôĐình Diệm regime in
the time and space of  and in the current reality of the South,” they
concluded, “was nothing but a fantasy in the clouds.” Trần Kim Tuyến
had, after all, contributed to one of several plots against Ngô Đình Diệm in
. Still, their extensive two-volume work complicated prevailing dim
impressions of the late president, emphasizing his determination to resist
by now-resented American efforts to commandeer the management of
the war, and unveiling the critical role played by Ambassador Lodge and the
CIA in enabling and orchestrating his demise. After , they noted, “the
American Embassy was extremely satisfied in achieving an aspiration . . .
which Mr. Diệm was determined to refuse . . . the establishment in every
Strategic Region of a structure commanded by an American director.”
The ripples from “How to Kill a President,” however, were dwarfed by the
sensational revelations in the Pentagon Papers, the leaked top secret US
Defense Department history of American involvement in Vietnam which
appeared in the New York Times beginning in June . Rivalled only by
coverage of the upcoming South Vietnamese presidential election in Sài
Gòn’s raucous and still precariously independent press, the Pentagon Papers
disclosures touched a nerve with war-weary and increasingly anti-American
readers. Much of the coverage focused on exposing American duplicity or
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perceived Vietnamese slights at the hands of the United States. On June ,
Điện Tín [Telegram], a southern-oriented pro-Dương Văn Minh daily,
printed what would have been a detailed comparison of American officials’
public statements with their leaked private remarks—were it not for exten-
sive government censorship rendering much of the column blank. The irony,
undoubtedly, was not lost on Điện Tín readers. Even more evocative was
a large (uncensored) cartoon showing a buxom American woman provoc-
atively stripping off an American flag to expose concealed secret documents,
an image scorning both American perfidy and licentiousness. Đối Diện,
meanwhile, a leading Catholic opposition journal, published a detailed
inquest of alleged American “neo-colonialism” [Thực dân mới] between
 and , drawing on the Pentagon Papers for inspiration. And
Điện Tín was one of several newspapers to highlight a sensitive December
 encounter in which then-US Ambassador Maxwell Taylor delivered
a humiliating rebuke to South Vietnam’s ruling generals.
One of the more enduring effects of the Pentagon Papers leaks, however,
was to further hasten NgôĐình Diệm’s unlikely rehabilitation. Long derided
as Mỹ Diệm [American Diệm] in communist propaganda to underscore his
apparent subservience to foreign patrons, the embattled former president re-
emerged in the Pentagon Papers as a forceful and determined leader who
consistently frustrated what were now widely regarded as sinister American
efforts to occupy and exploit Vietnam. Hòa Bình [Peace] newspaper, for
instance, reworked Trần Kim Tuyến’s well-known title with a piece head-
lined: Người Mỹ làm thế nào để giết một T.T. Việt Nam [How the Americans
Killed a Vietnamese President]. And Xây Dựng devoted the entire front
page of its  National Day edition to coverage of “martyred hero Ngô
Đình Diệm, who resisted the schemes of foreign states.” Abrupt though it
may have been, Ngô Đình Diệm’s transition to martyred defender of Viet-
namese sovereignty and dignity, an interpretation eagerly promoted by ben-
eficiaries like Nhân Xã, resonated with a South Vietnamese public that had
long since tired of the many hardships accompanying the massive American
escalation of the war.
In this context, rhetorical invocations of Ngô Đình Diệm’s name served
a versatile range of objectives, from projecting veiled scorn against the
United States to condemning, by extension, the late president’s successors,
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who succumbed to foreign enticement where their forerunner had defiantly
abstained. Certainly, in the US Embassy, the Ngô Đình Diệm revival was
understood to reflect what one report described as “a sublimated anti-
American nationalism which allows Vietnamese to praise Ngo Dinh Diem’s
resistance to foreigners without openly denouncing the United States.”
Nhân Xã, which had long relied on anti-American rhetoric—a  Đà
Nẵng pamphlet, for instance, warned that “sacrifices of [the] Vietnamese
become meaningless if they only benefit American foreign policy”—was
quick to deploy their redeemed champion in this manner. Trương Công
Cừu’s  eulogy lauded Ngô Đình Diệm as a “master and benefactor . . .
who oppose[d] the impetuous landing of foreign troops in our country,” an
implied but pointed critique of both Ngô Đình Diệm’s successors and their
American sponsors. And Võ Văn Hải, a Lower House Nhân Xã candidate
in Sài Gòn who demanded a full state funeral for NgôĐình Diệm eight years
after his death, referred in his platform to “striking proofs . . . in several
recent disclosures in the foreign and domestic press . . . that Ngo Dinh Diem
lost his life because he had energetically opposed the building of US military
bases in this country. He was one of those clear-minded persons who could
fathom the cunning and cruel schemes of the foreigners.”
Even South Vietnam’s largely southern liberal opposition, while much
less effusive in evaluating Ngô Đình Diệm’s legacy, embraced this line of
reasoning to emphasize the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu regime’s unfavorable per-
formance in comparison. A June ,  editorial by Tin Sáng [Morning
News], the flagship southern opposition newspaper managed by eminent
figures like Ngô Công Đức, Lý Chánh Trung, Hồ Ngọc Nhuận, and Lý Quí
Chung, cited the Pentagon Papers as proof of American deceit, while pro-
vocatively dismissing Nguyễn Văn Thiệu as a puppet, noting that “in 
years of history we have never seen anyone who can be considered a patriot
if he sides with foreign states.” And Trần Ngọc Châu, the Lower House
deputy whose politically motivated  arrest at Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s
behest was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, issued a similar
warning, urging him to mend fences with civilian politicians to resist “being
lured by Ambassador Bunker into a most dangerous scheme . . . [whereby]
the United States will possess every means of influencing and subverting the
government. . . .The all-too-shining examples of Mossadegh in Iran,
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Syngman Rhee in Korea and NgôĐình Diệm and Dương Văn Minh in Viet-
Nam are proofs of my observation.”
Published during the height of the  presidential campaign, the Pen-
tagon Papers also triggered the recurrence of Ngô Đình Diệm’s fate as
a campaign issue, beginning with a July  interview with Dương Văn Minh
by theWashington Post. One of three candidates along with Nguyễn Cao Kỳ
and the incumbent Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Dương Văn Minh sought to counter
mounting evidence that the president’s re-election was already pre-arranged
by harnessing American public opinion to pressure the State Department
into ensuring a fair election (a strategy that Nguyễn Văn Thiệu denounced
as “blackmail”). Domestically, on the other hand, the former general
hoped to minimize Catholic voter alienation while still rallying his southern
Buddhist base, whose loyalty derived primarily from his status as the face of
the Ngô Đình Diệm coup. When, for instance, Washington Post correspon-
dent Peter Jay asked his maid, “to all appearances a completely apolitical
Vietnamese lady,” who she supported, she immediately replied: “General
Minh. He was the one who threw out Diem and Nhu.” With these con-
stituencies in mind, Dương Văn Minh informed Jay (in an interview his
campaign staff subsequently translated and distributed locally) that, con-
trary to the Pentagon Papers, he had never contacted the CIA while planning
the coup, and that responsibility for Ngô Đình Diệm’s death fell on Nguyễn
Văn Thiệu who, tasked as a Catholic officer with ensuring the president’s
personal safety, had inexplicably arrived late at the palace, allowing the Ngô
brothers to flee toward their apparently unscripted demise. Courting the
formidably well-organized northern Catholic vote even more aggressively,
Nguyễn Cao Kỳ echoed Dương Văn Minh’s position that Nguyễn Văn
Thiệu’s dithering was to blame for Ngô Đình Diệm’s death in Lập Trường
[Viewpoint], his mouthpiece newspaper, while also condemning anti-
northern discrimination.
But it was the incumbent who arguably got the best of the politically
charged Ngô Đình Diệm exchanges. Responding to the sensational treat-
ment that the allegations against him were accorded in the press, Nguyễn
Văn Thiệu struck back against his opponents during an emotional July 
press conference. Dương Văn Minh’s “cowardly” accusations, he countered,
amounted to a dereliction of responsibility, a feeble attempt to pass the buck
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by blaming subordinates for his own failures in command. It was precisely
this sort of inept leadership, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu continued, that had seen his
rival’s hapless tenure cut short after just three months in power. Clearly
vulnerable to such charges of indecision and weakness, which had dogged
him ever since his abrupt January  dismissal, Dương Văn Minh
attempted an about-face, denying that he had blamed Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
for Ngô Đình Diệm’s death, and insisting that he had “always accepted full
responsibility” for the former president’s fate. Instead, he accused foreign
journalists of distorting his remarks, although, given that he had declined to
correct the Washington Post interview in the eleven days since its publica-
tion, and had even arranged for its translation and circulation, his demurral
was hardly convincing. One week later, in an interview with northern Cath-
olic Hòa Bình [Peace] newspaper, Dương Văn Minh attempted further
damage control, denying that he had referred to Ambassador Bunker as
a “vote rigging instigator,” and insisting that he and his fellow generals had
never intended for Ngô Đình Diệm to die.
With the outcome of the election—an opportunity to “smash the trea-
sonous, demagogic rhetoric of a minority of defeatists,” as one Nguyễn Văn
Thiệu campaign planning document put it—once again arranged long
before the polls opened, the electoral stakes of the ongoing Ngô Đình Diệm
exchanges were limited. Still, the manner in which the former president’s
contested legacy flared up during consecutive heated campaigns reveals the
extent to which his memory remained a live and extremely sensitive issue in
South Vietnam long after his death. As politicians like Dương Văn Minh
discovered, striking a public balance acceptable to both sides of the debate
was an awkward if not perilous proposition. Much of the difficulty stemmed
from the fact that interpretations of Ngô Đình Diệm were in essence state-
ments about the nature of South Vietnam itself, so deeply embedded were
the social faultlines that he had done so much to aggravate and enshrine.
Taking a definitive stand on the late president often meant signalling an
implied position on any number of delicate, vexing questions at the heart of
competing visions of how the proper balance of regional, religious, and
military or civilian power should lie. Given the acrimonious and intensely
polarized political environment that he left behind, Ngô Đình Diệm’s legacy
could scarcely have been anything but fraught and ambivalent.
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Nothing reflected this ambiguity and discord more than South Vietnam’s
National Day, an event marked by official if somewhat uneasy public cele-
bration, and followed the next day by more sincere but much more subdued
pockets of private mourning. For architects of the ambitiously self-
proclaimed “Revolution,” the anniversary of Ngô Đình Diệm’s downfall was
an opportunity to self-servingly define the coup as a spontaneous manifes-
tation of “pure national spirit,” as Trần Văn Đôn put it during his 
National Day remarks. Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s growing list of opponents,
which swelled considerably after his dubiously engineered  re-election,
also invoked the officially sanctioned symbolism of the occasion, hoping to
employ its dwindling ceremonial currency to cast legitimacy on their grie-
vances. On November , , for instance, Ấn Quang’s Thích Thiên Hoa
declared that he “regretted that under the present government, National Day
could not be celebrated correctly in accord with the spirit of the 
Revolution.” Sài Gòn’s journalists, on the other hand, had no such stake
in edifying the proceedings, and their coverage reveals a much more equiv-
ocal affair, replete with abiding bitterness beneath the celebratory public
facade. “If we didn’t have a National Day on November  each year,”
lamented a Chính Luận [Political Discussion] editorial, “perhaps our divided
situation would have faded somewhat. But every year we have a National
Day, and when National Day comes, there are people who see each other as
enemies.” “Are we Vietnamese happy or unhappy on the November  Rev-
olution Day?” another headline pondered.
In an atmosphere already imbued with nostalgia for the First Republic’s
comparative tranquility, the Pentagon Papers heightened the complexity of
Ngô Đình Diệm’s legacy. And though his image came to function as an icon
of South Vietnam’s contentious fragmentation, both criticism and praise for
the late president routinely emerged from unexpected sources, confounding
attempts to classify interpretations of his leadership into simple regional or
religious camps. As we have seen, many of Ngô Đình Diệm’s Catholic
constituents bemoaned the lasting detrimental effects of what was widely
regarded, however accurately, as the Diệmist convention of preference for
northern and central Catholics, inspiring significant if closeted Catholic
political support for sympathetic southern Buddhists like Trần Văn Hương.
Additionally, some of South Vietnam’s most fervent anti-communists, men
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like RDV Senator Phạm Nam Sách, came to regard Ngô Đình Diệm as
responsible for creating the conditions that enabled the communists’ rapid
rural ascent. The Communist Party had succeeded in “ruthlessly com-
mitting crimes never before seen in the history of humanity,” Phạm Nam
Sách declared during a  Senate address, because “since , in light of
the political and social evils committed by the former Ngô Đình Diệm
government, the communists have had a reason to use the pretext of
national democratic revolution, taking advantage of discontented people,
victims of the Diệm regime, the poor, and even frivolous patriots.”
Former adversaries, on the other hand, spoke of his qualities. Hà Thúc
Ký, one of Ngô Đình Diệm’s more prominent political prisoners, remem-
bered the former president as “a man with nationalist spirit, who loved his
country . . . though the people around him didn’t want to share power with
anybody. . . .Although the Ngô Đình Diệm regime made serious mistakes,
especially in the final years, in nine years in power, [it] managed to hold the
nation’s sovereignty.” Conceding the president’s aura of personal propri-
ety, no doubt to further absolve themselves from the enduring controversy
that their actions provoked, the architects of the  coup also tended
toward complimentary interpretations of Ngô Đình Diệm’s character (in
contrast to his far more sinister family) in their mostly self-exculpatory
memoirs. Tôn Thất Đính’s  Năm Binh Nghiệp [Twenty Years a Soldier],
one of the more extreme examples of this trend, portrays an impossibly
naïve and innocent Ngô Đình Diệm, doomed by a childlike faith in his
cunning and duplicitous brothers. Even veterans of the Struggle Move-
ment, arguably the regime’s most formidable non-communist challenger,
were sometimes willing to sing his praises. Writer Hoàng Nguyên Nhuận
allowed that Ngô Đình Diệm had been “a good nationalist who expelled the
last bastion of French colonialists,” while no less a figure than Struggle
Movement activist Mai Thọ Truyền startled a US Embassy officer during
a  conversation by “comment[ing] at length on Diem’s good qualities.”
The intricacies of the debate, however, did little to dampen its passion,
with rhetorical salvoes exchanged long after the guns of war fell silent. Đỗ
Mậu’s epic Việt Nammáu lửa quê hương tôi [Vietnam, My Country of Blood
and Fire], for instance, created a stir upon its release in  by singling out
Vietnamese Catholics, who Đỗ Mậu accused of “indirectly or directly
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pushing the Diệm brothers into a deep pit of sin, resulting in the collapse of
their regime and their assassination.” “Because the Ngô Đình Diệm gov-
ernment saw the people as a means to serve the regime,” he continued,
“it came to see the people as an enemy . . . and was thus compelled to
exterminate the Hòa Hảo, attack the Cao Đài, and finally, take up arms
against the Buddhists. The ultimate goal of this endeavor was to Cathol-
icize the people of the South, and grant the Catholic religion a monopoly
on the throne.” Reflecting the manner in which Ngô Đình Diệm came to
symbolize much deeper historical animosities, Đỗ Mậu also emphasized
the “persistence in space and time of the dogmatic and monopolistic spirit
of the Roman Catholic Church, and its exploitation of harmonious
accords between the colonialists and ‘Overseas Missionary Societies’ over
two centuries in the French empire’s policy of conquest.” Although “nine
years of being favored under the Diệm regime was not long enough to
deliver a force for subverting the structure of all national activity and
commanding every aspect of the economy, politics, culture, and the
defense of the nation,” he concluded, “the nine years of the Diệm regime
represented a final high point.” In response, former Second Republic
Senator Nguyễn Văn Chức published a -page rebuttal condemning Đỗ
Mậu’s use of “uneducated mob rhetoric” to denigrate Catholics, insisting
that the Ngô Đình Diệm regime was instead “merely the first victim . . . [of
the] Buddhist ‘Protect Religion’ struggle, the first step of a process that
toppled all authority in South Vietnam.” And “if the Diệm brothers per-
secuted or repressed Buddhism—and this is merely hypothetical, and not
actually the case—then it was entirely their fault alone, and not at all
related to the Roman Catholic Church.”
Nonetheless, as South Vietnam approached its fateful denouement, a ten-
tative consensus in the hotly contested public discourse on Ngô Đình Diệm
began to emerge between these extremes, whereby both the president’s
personal qualities and political failures were acknowledged simultaneously.
Tội nghiệp ông Diệm [Poor Mr. Diệm], a  essay by journalist Lý Chánh
Trung, encapsulates this more nuanced interpretation. Reflecting on his first
encounter with Ngô Đình Diệm as a student in Belgium, Lý Chánh Trung
recalled a man whose death was as tragic as his deposal was imperative. Ngô
Đình Diệm, he wrote, was “a gentle and virtuous man who loved his country,
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though he understood nothing about the problems of society . . . and it
seemed like he could only speak and not have a true dialogue with anybody.”
Ultimately, he concluded, the president had been a tragic figure, whose
“basic error was that he believed in his own ‘People’s Saviour, Wise Leader’
legend . . .which the Americans and a number of his underlings created to
take advantage of him. . . .When he realized it was just an illusion, it was
already too late: he died because of that illusion.” Still, seven years on, “even
victims of the regime . . . seemed more forgiving than they had been toward
Diệm,” though of course, Lý Chánh Trung observed, sympathy for Ngô
Đình Diệm was made possible only by his absence, which allowed “mem-
ories to fade, hatreds to be soothed, and suppressed hidden feelings to be
released.” “Furthermore,” he continued, “the reality of southern society went
from bad to worse, creating a tendency for people to remember only the
more appealing virtues of the Ngô Đình Diệm government whenever they
compare those days with the present.” And when it came to Ngô Đình
Diệm’s political legacy, Lý Chánh Trung was unequivocal:
To suggest that Ngô Đình Diệm’s government was a golden age, and that we
only need to emulate him in order to solve the country’s problems, like
a number of his henchmen are now proclaiming with much fanfare, is truly
ridiculous and shameless. Those who shout and weep around the name Diệm
are like a flock of crows on a corpse. With their plot to restore a Diệm regime
without Diệm so they can gorge themselves on extortion just like before,
please let them remember that the current of history never flows
backwards.
As we have seen then, owing primarily to factors which became appar-
ent only after his death, Ngô Đình Diệm’s reputation underwent a degree
of posthumous redemption, his status as defiant if quixotic patriot and
beacon of piety accentuated by the corruption and squalor that subsumed
South Vietnamese society after his passing. His improved personal stand-
ing coincided, however, with a growing consensus shared even by one-
time supporters that his record as head-of-state had been disastrous. And
when Lý Chánh Trung and others increasingly began to refer to “the
Diệm regime without Diệm” [Chế độ Diệm không Diệm] to characterize
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s administration, their intent could scarcely have been
less complimentary.
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The “Diệm Regime Without Diệm” [Chế Độ Diệm
Không Diệm]
Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the Diệmist political brand’s toxicity
was the abrupt and instructive collapse of the Nhân Xã Party. While the
party’s formation in  had raised wary eyebrows in Sài Gòn, in Central
Vietnam, where memories of the confrontation over Ngô family rule were
especially raw, the backlash was immediate, and fierce.Đà Nẵng – a city with
over four hundred thousand residents but, according to a US Consulate
report, “only  buildings [with] city water [and] woefully inadequate . . .
refuse collection, paved roads, and public health facilities” – barely managed
to contain violent clashes between pro and anti-Ngô Đình Diệm loyalists on
National Day, . With resentment already simmering between Mayor
Nguyên Ngọc Khôi (the former Cần Lao commander of Ngô Đình Diệm’s
presidential guard) and an ARVN garrison that concealed a “secret pro-
Buddhist organization among ARVN officers and men whose pro-Struggle
sympathies have retarded their promotion,” National Day was inevitably
a tense affair in a city once “ruled with an iron hand by the Cần Lao Party
under Ngô Đình Cẩn,” as the consulate put it. The mysterious overnight
appearance on Đà Nẵng streets of banners reading “Mourn President Ngo
Dinh Diem’s death for the fatherland,” “The spirit of Ngo Dinh Diem en-
dures forever and the people remember it gratefully as a positive example for
all men,” and “President Ngo Dinh Diem is immortal,” among other slogans,
enraged ARVN Buddhists, who made clear their intent to remove the of-
fending banners by force. The timely intervention of Ấn Quang’s Thích
Minh Tuấn, who privately assured the consulate that the mayor’s Nhân
Xã-dominated “Đà Nẵng Committee to Defend the Republican Regime”
was almost certainly responsible, helped placate the agitated soldiers and
prevented street fighting between ARVN and the police, though not before
Thích Minh Tuấn likewise made known his determination to “resist anyone
who attempts to reverse the  Revolution.”
If a hostile Buddhist reaction against Nhân Xã was to be expected, the
frosty reception afforded the party from fellow Catholics was all the more
telling, revealing once again the noxious character of Ngô Đình Diệm’s
political legacy, whatever his personal merits may have been. Nhân Xã’s July
 unveiling in Huế was boycotted by the city’s archbishop, while local
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Catholic luminaries like Lower House Deputy Nguyễn Lý Hương and Hy
Vọng [Hope] publishers Nguyễn Văn Dương and Bùi Thế Cẩn spurned the
party’s membership invitations. Nguyễn Gia Hiên likewise vetoed GSF
cooperation with Nhân Xã, explaining to a CIA contact that he had quit the
Cần Lao years ago “because of its lack of true political organization and
inadequate programs.” “As a political party,” he reportedly remarked, “the
Can Lao had been ‘lousy.’” And Sài Gòn Archbishop Nguyễn Văn Bình
was no less dismissive when courted by Nhân Xã. “I told them plainly that
the Can Lao page of Vietnamese history has been turned,” he remarked,
warning that Nhân Xã would serve only to help the communists score
propaganda victories, and that exclusively Catholic political groups had
no chance of succeeding in a majority Buddhist society.
Like so many non-communist parties before it, Nhân Xã also fell victim
to fragmentation, with a pro-Nguyễn Văn Thiệu faction led by Ngô Khắc
Tỉnh and Lê Trọng Quát abandoning the Trương Công Cừu wing of the
party in  to form the People’s National Reconstruction Force [Lực
lượng Nhân dân Kiến Quốc]. Asked about his departure, Lê Trọng Quát
could not resist a parting shot: “the existing concept of the Nhan Xa as a re-
emergence of the Can Lao is not viable,” he replied, “[and] the tradition of
secret cadre organization [is] outmoded.” And indeed, despite an impres-
sive turnout for its outwardly apolitical Ngô Đình Diệm memorials, when it
came to recruitment, the party struggled to overcome decidedly negative
perceptions of their fallen champion’s politics. In Phước Tuy Province, for
instance, where influential local party boss Phạm Văn Thước served as
provincial council chairman and was regarded by the US Embassy as the
“most widely respected of local government officials,” total Nhân Xã
strength in the province stalled at just seventy members. “Most people fear
politics,” Phạm Văn Thước admitted, “remembering political repression of
former times.” Despite rallies in Phước Tuy featuring both Ngô Khắc Tỉnh
and Trương Công Cừu, “the educated class,” the embassy noted, “continues
to view the party with some suspicion. Well aware that Nhan Xa is closely
linked to the former Can Lao Party of President Diem’s reign, many civil
servants appear to hesitate to join the new party.” Similarly, although
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu ultimately refrained from formally adopting Nhân Xã
as his official government party, his association with senior party officials
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like Ngô Khắc Tỉnh proved controversial. Former Interior Minister Trần
Đình Nam, regarded by embassy contacts as an authority on Central Viet-
namese politics, proclaimed that inviting Nhân Xã to join the NSDF was
a “major blunder.” “Nhan Xa is controlled mainly by rich ex-Can Lao people
who prospered under Diem,” he remarked dismissively. “They have little
popular support to give the president and, having access to the coffers of the
GVN, the president has no need of their money.” Beset by fragmentation
and the lingering stigma of association with Ngô Đình Diệm, the remaining
Nhân Xã faction was dealt an abrupt final blow in January  when
Trương Công Cừu illegally fled to France, reportedly to help his -year-
old son evade ARVN conscription.
Spiralling despair over the trajectory of the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu regime
also saw the invocation of Ngô Đình Diệm’s name as pejorative shorthand
for political depravity. When Nguyễn Văn Thiệu outlined plans for a new
pro-government party during an April  address to the Assembly, “most
senators,” an eyewitness reported, “whether speaking in support of the pre-
sident’s initiative or not, expressed concern lest the president repeat the
mistake of former President Diem and fashion a pro-government party that
would then be used for his personal aggrandizement.” More ominous still
were the unconstitutional arrests of high-profile opposition deputies like
Trần Ngọc Châu and Ngô Công Đức, with the latter’s May  detention
prompting a Lower House resolution demanding his release, and the con-
demnation of his “unacceptable” and “political” confinement even in inde-
pendent but habitually pro-government Chính Luận and Xây Dựng.
Former Minister of Information Tôn Thất Thiện warned US Embassy offi-
cials that the incident marked the “beginning of the end” for the Second
Republic, comparing Ngô Công Đức’s captivity to the  arrest of Phan
Quang Đán at Ngô Đình Diệm’s behest.
By now, even senior government officials had started to echo the tenor if
not the tone of radical student protesters, whose communiqués routinely
accused Nguyễn Văn Thiệu of “re-establishing the despotism of the 
Ngo Dinh Diem regime.” In December , Ambassador to the United
States Bùi Diễm requested a private meeting “as ‘Citizen Diem’ rather than
ambassador” with veteran diplomatWilliam H. Sullivan, in which he relayed
his “concern over the deteriorating political situation which he found in
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Saigon during his recent visit there.” Likening the current atmosphere to
“the sort of discontent which welled up against President Diem . . in ,”
Bùi Diễm warned that “the catalyst for Diem’s ultimate overthrow was
relatively minor, but was able to draw on all those other sources of discon-
tent which were already in existence.” “His fears were compounded,” Sulli-
van noted, “by [the] comparison which he noted between [the] lifestyles of
Thieu and Diem. He felt Thieu was becoming a ‘prisoner of the Palace’ and
that he was ‘institutionalizing his natural shyness into official austerity.’”
Concerned that his American counterparts were “inclined to minimize [the]
significance of this situation and concentrate instead on [the] need for
‘effective government,’” Bùi Diễm again ominously “raised a comparison
with President Diem, who . . .was [also] ‘effective’ right to the end.”
No doubt aware that he lacked his predecessor’s anti-French and newly
uncovered anti-American nationalist credentials while sharing his aloof and
uncharismatic image, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu exploited his control over the
Supreme Court and National Assembly with legislation effectively guaran-
teeing his already likely re-election in . The ensuing contest was a public
relations disaster, marking a point of no return for the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
regime. Seeking to disqualify Nguyễn Cao Kỳ by compelling candidates to
win endorsements from mostly pro-Nguyễn Văn Thiệu assemblymen and
province chiefs (a provision he had condemned as unconstitutional when
suggested by Nguyễn Cao Kỳ in ), Nguyễn Văn Thiệu opted to run
unopposed when both Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and Dương Văn Minh dropped out
in protest after the palace’s written vote-rigging instructions to province and
district-level officials inevitably surfaced. A brief wave of demonstrations
by students, veterans, opposition politicians and religious and ethnic minor-
ity groups quickly gave way to despondency and sardonic resignation.
“Comparisons with Diem are now often heard,” the US Embassy reported,
while Saigon Post columnist Trần Nam, taking his morning stroll on election
day, recorded overhearing the following: “‘The late President Ngo Dinh
Diem,’ a wag said, ‘could have turned in his eternal resting place to exclaim,
‘comrade, you beat me!’”
Perhaps the most serious consequence for the incumbent president, how-
ever, was the permanent breakdown of his de facto alliance with the northern
Catholic political groups that dominated the Senate. By running unopposed,
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Nguyễn Văn Thiệu achieved the unlikely feat of uniting South Vietnam’s
chronically divided opposition, with the GSF and Greater Republican
Masses Party [Chánh Đảng Đại chung Cộng hòa] endorsing a Buddhist-
sponsored September communiqué calling for his immediate withdrawal.
Motivated both by disgust—political operative Đặng Đức Khôi, for instance,
complained to a CIA contact that “he had been a strong supporter of Ngo
Dinh Diem until the last few months . . . and his revulsion against Thieu is
now stronger than his final revulsion against Diem”—as well as a fear of
-style scapegoating and reprisals, other Catholic luminaries and orga-
nizations lined up to follow suit. Pax Romana, the Catholic intellectual
group that had agonized over its position on Ngô Đình Diệm, was unequiv-
ocal when it came to Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, issuing a public statement on
September  denouncing the election as “lacking in democracy and popular
enthusiasm,” and warning that “the people have almost lost confidence in
Thieu’s leadership.” The following morning, Sài Gòn Archbishop Nguyễn
Văn Bình awoke to find his house surrounded by hundreds of angry par-
ishioners demanding that he revoke his July  call for a heavy Catholic
voter turnout. After a week of intense grassroots campaigning, the arch-
bishop relented, affirming in a September  Xây Dựng interview that “the
faithful are duty-bound to oppose elections that are fraudulent and lacking
in democracy.” “We would like to support Thieu,” he explained to Cath-
olic Senator Pauline Nguyễn Văn Thơ, “but we cannot if he continues his
present course. He won’t give us the chance to help him.” Meanwhile, in
the Senate, Huỳnh Văn Cao’s northern Catholic-dominated pro-
government “Vietnam Sky” [Trời Việt] slate broke ranks, partnering with
Senate Chairman Nguyễn Văn Huyền’s moderate Catholic Bông huệ [Lily]
bloc to pass a resolution, with twenty-eight of thirty-one votes declaring the
election to be “against the public will” and “likely to bring overall disaster to
South Vietnam.”
His re-election secured if forever resented, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu hastened
to crush what remained of the opposition. Taking advantage of the 
communist Easter Offensive, the president exploited the Emergency Powers
legislation he was granted after protracted Senate resistance by imposing
Decree Laws  and , effectively silencing the press and disbarring
independent political parties (including all three Senate lists), respectively.
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What little popular sympathy remained for Nguyễn Văn Thiệu promptly
evaporated. Speaking to a US Embassy source who “had never seen him so
seemingly dejected by a political event,” Conservative Đại Việt Senator and
Chính Luận publisher Đặng Văn Sung threatened to shutter his newspaper
rather than see it become a “prostitute” of the administration. Having
supported both the Election Law signatures provision and the Emergency
Powers bill, which explicitly stated it could be applied only to matters of
defense, security, economics and finance, Đặng Văn Sung now warned that
“South Vietnam was entering a new Diem-type dictatorship.” In Chính
Luận, he attempted an uncharacteristically defiant stand, penning an August
 editorial excoriating the “unconstitutional” newspaper legislation, levelling
comparisons with the Ngô Đình Diệm era, and depicting Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
as “emerging alone . . . above a sea of mute, subservient South Vietnamese
people.” “What do the people think of the true nature of the Second Republic
of Vietnam?” he inquired rhetorically, “and what will be the ideal for them if
they wish to sacrifice their lives in the struggle against communist dictator-
ship? Once they review everything, they will realize that nothing remains.”
In response, the government pre-empted the despairing senator’s recurring
threats to cease publication, seizing the August  edition and charging Chính
Luận with violating Article (a) (“jeopardizing national security and public
order”) and Article  (“publishing information, documents or arguments
aimed at extolling the theories, policies or actions of communism or pro-
communist neutrality”) of the new press code. “Police efforts to confiscate the
edition were thorough,” remarked the US Embassy, which obtained a secret
draft from Đặng Văn Sung himself, “and no copies reached the streets.”
With the media now firmly under executive control, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
turned his attention to filling the political void left by Decree Law .
Having long since lost patience with the fragmented and quarrelsome polit-
ical groups marginalized by his recent emergency fiats, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
proceeded to unveil the Democracy Party [Đảng Dân chủ], the long-awaited
manifestation of the pro-government party he had hinted at to growing
degrees of apprehension since taking office. Like the Cần Lao Party before
it, the Democracy Party was divided into overt and covert cells. The party’s
public façade consisted of popular but mostly powerless public notables,
including Party Chairman TrầnMinh Tùng, described as “a docile southerner
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who will cause no problems” by RDV Senator Nguyễn Văn Ngãi. De facto
party control, on the other hand, was wielded by the clandestine apparatus,
helmed by Nguyễn Văn Ngãi and political advisor Nguyễn Văn Ngân and
staffed primarily by military and police officials, whose involvement was kept
nominally secret in line with constitutional stipulations proscribing their
membership in political parties.
Starting in earnest in the fall of , a wave of civil servants and soldiers
complained of coercive tactics employed to compel them to join the party,
including arbitrary dismissal, prosecution on trumped-up charges, conscrip-
tion (for government workers) or transfers to insecure communist-
controlled areas. Nguyễn Bé, the highly regarded Director of the National
Training Center [Trung tâm Huấn luyện Cán bộ Quốc gia] in Vũng Tàu,
was perhaps the most high-profile victim, dismissed in February  for
both refusing to join and refusing to allow the Vũng Tàu school to train
Democracy Party cadres. Interviewed shortly after his departure, he declared
that “the Democracy Party is intended simply to perpetuate President Thieu
in power and has no greater national purpose and no independent ideology
that will appeal to the Vietnamese people.” RDV organizer Nguyễn Bảo,
on the other hand, projected blasé pragmatism in response to coerced
recruitment of Đại Việt cadre into Democracy Party ranks: “Now we return
to the secret ways of the French era . . .We Vietnamese are a family-oriented
people and, though sometimes necessity forces us to play the whore [the
Democracy Party], we always come back to our family [the RDV Party].”
Although dismayed by Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s recent “obstruction of free
elections,” Nguyễn Bảo professed a surprising degree of confidence in his
party’s fortunes following Decree Law . “Because many Revolutionary
Đại Việt members have infiltrated the Thieu regime by ‘joining’ the Democ-
racy Party,” he noted, “the Revolutionary Đại Việt Party is now stronger and
has a more intimate understanding of GVN internal workings than
before.”
From its inception, the Democracy Party drew predictable comparisons
to Ngô Đình Diệm’s Cần Lao. Trần Kim Tuyến, an early Cần Lao architect
before turning against his patron, was one of many to observe the obvious
parallels, although, speaking to a US Embassy source, he emphasized a fatal
flaw in both the Cần Lao and the Democracy Party’s genesis:
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Those who want to build parties like the Can Lao or Democracy Party start
from the premise that the Communist Party is the source of strength in
communist regimes, and that this example should be copied. But they turn the
development sequence on its head. Whereas the Communist Party is created
first, develops, then seizes power, and finally establishes an administration as
an extension of its power, those who established the Can Lao and now want to
create a Democracy Party think they can reverse the sequence by having an
established administration create a political party. It took some of the Can Lao
organizers including himself [Trần Kim Tuyến] four years to see their error,
according to Tuyen, while some never did.
The result of repeating the Cần Lao Party’s mistakes, the former intelligence
director predicted, would be the “exacerbation of corruption, ineptitude and
favoritism, which will help the communists.” Trần Kim Tuyến joined
a litany of former high-ranking Cần Lao officials whose objections to the
Democracy Party’s forced enlistment were recorded, including former Agri-
culture Minister Lê Văn Đông, who “sharply objects to the coercive aspects
of recruiting;” labor leader Trần Quốc Bửu, who believed “Thieu was making
a serious mistake in pressuring civil servants and others to join;” and even
Đà Nẵng Mayor Nguyễn Ngọc Khôi, who, despite his enthusiasm for direct-
ing state resources to serve Nhân Xã, drew the line at mandatory Democracy
Party membership, stating that he was “adamantly opposed to any such
effort, citing the example of Ngo Dinh Diem and the Can Lao.”
But for most South Vietnamese observers, the Democracy Party’s failings
were a matter of substance rather than strategy. And with his apparent
embrace of the Cần Lao precedent, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu appeared to put the
finishing touches on South Vietnam’s political decay, heightening an already
pervasive sense that the glimmer of optimism which the Second Republic
once represented had been extinguished. No party’s fate better reflects this
transition than the instructive demise of the Progressive National Movement
[Phong trào Quốc gia Cấp tiến], a party that emerged proclaiming its devo-
tion the concept of loyal opposition. Established in , the Progressive
National Movement pledged subservience to the president on foreign policy
and defense, limiting itself to domestic policy suggestions in a spirit of
overall cooperation. Founded against a backdrop of growing concern
over Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s intentions, party elders were undeterred: “They
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wouldn’t dare try to close us down and return to the days of President
Diem,” asserted Chairman Nguyễn Văn Bông during the party’s introduc-
tion in Biên Hòa Province. Three years later, the group found itself
effectively legislated out of existence by Decree Law . Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
was “acting as if he did not need the people with him,” concluded despon-
dent Party Secretary General Nguyễn Ngọc Huy, who interpreted the Emer-
gency Powers acts as a clear indication that “the Thieu administration
intended to revive the ‘Diem dictatorship.’” Beleaguered Senate Chairman
Nguyễn Văn Huyền, “long considered ‘Mr. Upper House’ for his influence in
the chamber,” according to a US Embassy report, likewise found his Bông huệ
group all but precluded by Decree Law  from contesting the  Senate
elections. “They have viewed their role as essentially a ‘brake’ on the presi-
dent’s natural authoritarianism, and as the last remaining guardians of a robust
democratic spirit,” concluded an eyewitness account of the group’s final
Upper House session. “A departing member remarked,” the report continued:
that the “noble experiment” in constitutionalism launched in —at
American urging, he noted pointedly—was turning sour. He had been sur-
prised in , he said, at the number of qualified people who “engaged
themselves” enthusiastically in the experiment by running for office that year.
These were individuals who had earlier withdrawn from political participation
in the late s, when Diem’s rule began to turn authoritarian. These “good”
people are retreating once again, the senator commented, once more waiting
for some watershed before engaging themselves.
Long before its final military collapse then, the Second Republic was judged
by its most committed proponents to have ended in unmitigated political
failure.
An Ambiguous Legacy
Sài Gòn’s Notre Dame Basilica, November , . Where emotional crowds
had once spilled into the streets, there was now “room in the cathedral for all
who came,” an observer of the proceedings reported. “About two-thirds of
those attending were women,” he noted, and “of them, the overwhelming
majority were either very old women, or young school girls . . . brought in
from parochial schools in Gia Đinh’s heavily Catholic Hóc Môn District or
from Catholic orphanages in the Sài Gòn area. The VIP pews in the front of
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the Cathedral were not filled.” With attendance estimated at no more than
two-thousand—a far cry from the forty-thousand strong turnout predicted
by the People’s National Reconstruction Force—the  Ngô Đình Diệm
memorial was a decidedly subdued affair. Ten years after his death, it
seemed the wave of nostalgia for NgôĐình Diệmwas subsiding as quickly as
it had appeared.
Still, as we have seen, memories of the late president loomed large in
South Vietnam’s Second Republic, his image serving as an avatar for an era
whose appeal was apparent only with hindsight. Far from the shrinking
posthumous presence that most accounts of his legacy have presumed, Ngô
Đình Diệm remained an indelible symbol after his death, highlighting the
political, religious, and regional divisions in South Vietnam. His contested
legacy established dynamic patterns of political conflict that endured
throughout the Second Republic, and provided yardsticks and a common
shorthand vocabulary with which subsequent politicians and political devel-
opments were measured. Competing impressions of Ngô Đình Diệm both
informed and complicated the challenging process of restoring the state’s
legal basis, beginning with the constitution and elections of . And
whatever their positions on the former president, all parties—from his vic-
tims to his passionate if largely self-serving Nhân Xẫ Party champions—
understood that their efforts were a continuation of the conflict instigated by
decisions during his final years.
Ngô Đình Diệm has been at the heart of recent scholarship on South
Vietnam, much of it echoing earlier Vietnamese-language dialogues that
dispelled his presumed subservience to the United States and revealed his
considerable agency. But the heated debates over his legacy during South
Vietnam’s final years have hardly featured in the discussions now taking
place among scholars. To evaluate Ngô Đình Diệm’s presidency and to
understand the politics of South Vietnam’s fateful final period, it is crucial
to examine the contemporaneous exchanges that were carried out during
those years in speeches, street demonstrations, and across the pages of
South Vietnam’s cacophonous free press. Among South Vietnamese ob-
servers, Ngô Đình Diệm’s agency was always more apparent than it has
been for generations of English-language scholars, though his contempor-
aries were also taken aback when the Pentagon Papers revealed the extent
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of his single-mindedness in resisting American interference. Instead, char-
acterized by fluidity and searching ambiguity, their discourses focused on
the president’s conduct and character, the latter undergoing a startling
reinterpretation in response to both the Pentagon Papers and nostalgia
for the period before South Vietnamese society’s rapid decline. Nonethe-
less, while many anti-communist South Vietnamese gained a new admi-
ration for Ngô Đình Diệm, they decisively rejected the political institutions
he had created, recoiling from what we might call the “Diệmist” political
style of centralized clandestine power impervious to crescendos of popular
disaffection. As Nguyễn Văn Thiệu soon discovered, a “Diệm regime with-
out Diệm,” and thus shorn of the propriety and unwavering patriotism that
its namesake retroactively represented, was an overwhelmingly unappeal-
ing proposition.
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A B S T R A C T
Although recent English-language Vietnam War scholarship has devoted
considerable attention to reassessing the Ngô Đình Diệm era, contempora-
neous South Vietnamese interpretations of the president’s tenure have been
largely overlooked. Contrary to prevailing assumptions that his influence
ended abruptly with his  murder, Ngô Đình Diệm was a hotly debated
figure long after his death. Moreover, his contested legacy came to symbolize
South Vietnam’s enduring political, regional and religious schisms, con-
tributing to and reinforcing his country’s profound social fragmentation.
The fluid and ambiguous memory that Vietnamese had of his time in office
had a substantial impact on subsequent political developments, establishing
patterned dynamics of political conflict that endured throughout the Second
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Republic and providing conceptual yardsticks against which subsequent
politicians and political developments were measured. Ngô Đình Diệm’s
fraught symbolic resonance and significant posthumous political impact are
therefore crucial dimensions to consider in evaluating his legacy.
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